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PREFACE
This paper was written to frame the work of the Seventh Collo-
quium on Challenges in International Refugee Law, held at the
University of Michigan Faculty of Law, on March 27–29, 2015. To
some extent, therefore, it has already served its purpose. It is some-
what tempting in the wake of the Colloquium to completely recon-
struct the paper in light of the conversations and conclusions of that
event. Such reconstruction, however, would be misleading. Instead,
I have chosen to publish the paper in a form that is very similar to
its earlier iteration, with a few corrections, clarifications, and ex-
planatory notes about some key pieces that formed part of the Col-
loquium conversation.
Given this decision, the paper now serves three purposes. First,
it presents the dilemmas of ‘political opinion’ jurisprudence that
Colloquium participants considered. The central questions are
presented here as the participants saw them. This presentation
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serves, therefore, to deepen one’s reading of the Michigan Guide-
lines on Risk for Reasons of Political Opinion. The paper ad-
dresses many questions that many a first-time reader of the
Guidelines may raise in their own mind on reading the Guideline
text. Second, the paper details, as well as detailing the case for these
Guidelines. The analysis here makes plain that these guidelines fill
an increasingly important gap in refugee decision making. Finally,
because of the case-driven methodology of the paper, it presents a
thorough overview of contemporary political opinion
jurisprudence.
The paper has had an unusual gestation that has been excep-
tionally rewarding for me as a scholar and author. The traditional
‘first footnote of thanks’ is therefore completely inadequate. It was
a daunting honor to be asked by Professor Hathaway to serve as
Research Director for the Seventh Colloquium on Challenges in In-
ternational Refugee Law. In this role, I had the benefit of working
with three successive groups of Michigan Law students in develop-
ing the paper. The first group, in the autumn of 2013, began from a
very vague sketch of an idea and spent a term completing a series of
research tasks that were invaluable in developing my thinking
about political opinion. The second group, a year later, spent a term
working through an earlier draft of the paper, providing detailed
critique and assessment, as well as further research. This term in-
cluded a seminar session in Michigan where the students and I de-
bated each section of the draft paper. The final group worked with
the near-final version of the paper to transform it into questions to
frame the Colloquium conversation. As a result of all of this work,
the current version of this paper has had a more thorough and at-
tentive review than anything I have written since my own graduate
work.
After all of this had been completed, the Colloquium itself was
an astonishing experience, where seven experts from around the
world devoted their complete attention to the ideas presented by this
paper over the two day period. Some of my ideas were taken up by
this group, some were challenged, some were transformed. All of
this took place in a highly collegial setting, with the goal of improv-
ing the law and its real world outcomes.
All of this adds up to a unique and precious experience in
scholarly life. For this I am most grateful to James C. Hathaway.
Finally, I want to thank two students at Allard Law who
worked with me in Vancouver over the past two years. The first is
Dylan Mazur, law student and Executive Director of the Vancou-
ver Association for Survivors of Torture, a vital refugee support
organization, who read many of the political opinion cases with me.
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The second is Catherine Repel, my highly efficient and always
good-humoured research assistant, who worked with me through
each successive draft.
All of this said, I turn now to the traditional starting point.
INTRODUCTION
The Refugee Convention extends protection to those at risk of being
persecuted because of their political opinions. Political opinion is the final
factor in the Convention’s list of “grounds” of protection, where a refugee
is defined as a person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country. . .1
This list is the starting point for approaching the puzzle that political opin-
ion has become: it is evident in this formula that political opinion is not
quite the same as the other identity or status-linked grounds for refugee
protection. It is, however, important not to overstate this distinction; each
of the five grounds is well recognized in anti-discrimination law.
For obvious reasons, this ground for protection comes closest to the
Cold War roots of refugee jurisprudence and most directly reflects the
trope of the political refugee. It is not surprising that this ground has been
interpreted broadly, given that it fits most closely with the popular imagi-
nation of who is a refugee. The Convention’s working papers (travaux
pre´paratoires) show that the drafters conceptualized political opinion ex-
pansively from the outset, indicating that the ground should include “dip-
lomats thrown out of office,”2 people “whose political party had been
outlawed,”3 and “individuals who fled from revolutions.”4
It is settled law that protection based on political opinion is not lim-
ited to people who are members of a political party, or who are engaged in
electoral politics, or who embrace in some way a particular political ideol-
ogy. It is similarly well established that the basis of protection is “opinion”
rather than activity, so there is no requirement that an individual has for-
mally expressed their views. Indeed, the individual need not even hold the
opinion that creates the risk of being persecuted, as there is general agree-
1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I(a)(2), opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954). The second
clause, omitted here, includes stateless persons on the same bases.
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ment that “imputed” political opinion satisfies the Convention’s
requirement.5
To get some sense of how divergently political opinion has been un-
derstood, here are the examples that Hathaway and Foster have included
in their second edition of the Law of Refugee Status:
Among those acts that have been construed as expressions of po-
litical opinion are public statements regarding the unfair distribu-
tion of food in Iraq, a public accusation of judicial ineptness where
such conduct was considered “anti-Islamic,” attempts by a Guate-
malan literacy teacher to educate the population, the prepared-
ness of a Sinhalese travel agent to engage in business with Tamil
clients, the supply of business services to governmental and mili-
tary institutions, employment by political figures including the
government, actual, imputed, or implied advocacy of human
rights, including labor rights, undertaking humanitarian work, de-
fection from the KGB, illegal departure or stay abroad, the lodg-
ment of a (failed) claim for refugee status abroad, and violation of
a politically motivated criminal law. Even the refusal to declare a
political opinion – in other words a position of neutrality – might
lead to an imputation of a political opinion.6
These examples demonstrate that many refugee decision-makers have
been attentive to the political and social contexts in which opinions are
formed, and aware of the vital role that context plays in determining the
limits of the political realm.
This breadth leads to a central question about political opinion as a
ground of protection: is there any kind of strongly held belief that is not a
political opinion? The notion of infinite breadth is out of step with most
judicial decision making and is inherently unappealing to states party to
the Refugee Convention. Further, it does not fit the refugee definition’s
central requirement that not every risk of being persecuted will make a
person a refugee: the risk must be “for reasons of” a stated ground.
Decision-makers have almost unanimously sought to define political
opinion so that “[n]ot just any dissent to any organization will unlock the
gates to . . . asylum. . .”7 What the courts have disagreed about, however, is
how to implement this distinction. The starkest points of this disagreement
are seen in the contrast between the Supreme Court of Canada’s view in
Ward v. Canada8 and the former New Zealand Refugee Status Appeal
5. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS
409-23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2014) (1991); GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MC-
ADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 89, 104 (Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2007)
(1983).
6. HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 5, at 413-15 (citations omitted).
7. Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 750 (Can.).
8. Id.
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Authority’s more recent view.9 The Canadian Court had specifically ac-
cepted Guy Goodwin-Gill’s statement that political opinion ought to in-
clude “any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of state,
government, and policy may be engaged.”10 The New Zealand tribunal, by
contrast, found nearly twenty years later that this definition was “too
broad to be of any meaningful assistance.”11 The tension over interpreting
political opinion falls between these poles, and has increased in recent
years as the number of claims at the limit of existing jurisprudence has
increased, especially in two categories: flight from violent criminal groups
and requests for protection made by whistleblowers.
The tension between the Supreme Court of Canada and the New Zea-
land Refugee Status Appeals Authority raises the overarching question of
whether political opinion should be defined at all. It is evident that ex-
isting definitions have not provided sufficient guidance, and that there is
no definition in the adjacent area of human rights law that can be logically
imported. A starting premise of this paper is that a broadly agreed-upon
definition of political opinion would advance the jurisprudence by provid-
ing a consistent standard. This is especially important as the overwhelming
majority of refugee status determinations are made by decision-makers
facing extremely high caseloads, who may not have legal training. Despite
this, it is vital to keep in mind what lies behind the debate about the value
of a definition. A definitional approach encourages abstraction, and cases
that abstract a political opinion from its context are those that open them-
selves up to appearing frivolous or nonsensical. Context is vital to under-
standing the substance of “political.” A new, definition-centered approach
must include guidance on how to take context into account, simply repeat-
ing its importance is insufficient.
In pursuit of a new definition of political opinion, and, with it, a new
analytical framework for decision-makers, the methodology in this paper
is case-based and oriented around the central questions that must be an-
swered in order for a new definition to be successful. The paper follows a
case-based approach for two reasons. The first is that contemporary case
law is the most effective way of observing the problems presented with the
existing approaches to political opinion. The second is that case law is the
best source of material for testing possible new direction and for assessing
what will or will not work, from the point of view of the decision-makers
who are ultimately charged with bringing refugee law to life. Case law is,
thus, a rich source of both problems and solutions. This paper focuses on
constructing a tool that is practical, rather than theoretical in focus; the
analysis is developed out of the dilemmas facing decision-makers, not the-
oretically sophisticated scholars of jurisprudence. Developing my analysis
directly out of the dilemmas that decision-makers are grappling with,
9. Refugee Appeal No. 76339 [2010] NZAR 386 (R.S.A.A.). The Refugee Status Ap-
peals Authority was superseded in 2010 by the Immigration and Protection Tribunal.
10. Ward, 2 S.C.R. at 746.
11. Refugee Appeal No. 76339, [2010] NZAR ¶ 88.
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reveals a bias in my approach: I am more interested in constructing a tool
that will work for first instance decision-makers than in theoretically so-
phisticated jurisprudence.
The questions at the heart of this paper are those that must be an-
swered in order to generate a new definition of political opinion in the
refugee law context:
1. What is an “opinion”?
2. Which opinions are “political”?
3. Are there any “political opinions” that ought not to be the basis
for refugee protection?
In keeping with a commitment to a case-focused approach, the paper is
organized around case law clusters, and the questions are used in a secon-
dary manner to develop the analysis within these clusters.
This paper has the twinned aims of setting the stage for developing a
new approach to analyzing political opinion in refugee law and of tenta-
tively proposing a new framework for analysis. Emphasizing the dilemmas
presented by the case law, this paper proposes an approach where the im-
portance of understanding how and why imputed opinions must be pro-
tected is the basis for understanding “opinion” more generally, and where
“political” is understood as relating to power structures that can exercise
coercion in a given society. I suggest that some political opinions ought to
be excluded from the refugee definition on the basis of the egregious
human rights infringements they reflect.12
With these aims in mind, the paper opens by setting out some starting
points to frame the discussion, including existing definitions. It then
surveys the major cases that have fully grappled with what political opin-
ion means. The following sections explore how political-opinion jurispru-
dence operates in a series of case clusters, including cases concerning flight
from the People’s Republic of China’s (“PRC”) one child policy, military
conscientious-objection, whistleblowing, flight from armed groups, and po-
litical opinions on gender. The final section of the paper outlines essential
features of any new approach by answering the three questions outlined
above and, based on this analysis, proposes a tentative new framework.
I.  STARTING POINTS
Prior to launching into the case methodology, which grounds the new
framework, this section canvasses key background sources: the Refugee
Convention itself, international human rights law, and existing definitions
of political opinion.
12. This suggestion was strongly rejected at the Colloquium, and I was ultimately per-
suaded that the “exclusions” provisions of the Convention’s Article 1(F) would accomplish
the purpose I envisioned here. The principle that some political opinions are so repugnant as
to be undeserving of refugee protection remains sound.
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As a matter of first principles, the meaning of political opinion is a
question of treaty interpretation. As such, the primary interpretive tools
are the ordinary rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which consist of good-faith interpretation that takes into account
the provision’s context, object, and purpose.13 The Refugee Convention
has been widely accepted as establishing a framework for surrogate human
rights protection by the international community when an individual’s
state of origin is unable or unwilling, for discriminatory reasons, to provide
such support.14 Good-faith interpretation, therefore, must reflect the
human rights aims of the Convention.
Attuning to the “context” of political opinion within the Refugee
Convention requires attention to the term’s place within the definition it-
self. This is important in two ways. First, it is important because the nos-
citur a sociis principle tells us that items on a list ought to be interpreted
by reference to one another—in other words, in the context of the protec-
tion against discriminatory persecution afforded by the refugee conven-
tion, “political opinion,” must have something in common with race,
religion, nationality, and membership in a particular social group. Even
though political opinion sticks out as different on this list, an interpretive
strategy must seek out similarities between political opinion and the other
grounds. These similarities lie primarily in the ideals of anti-discrimination
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. The basic interpretation rules are set
out in Article 31:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related
to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
14. See, e.g., HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 5, at 193-97.
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and civil and political freedom that have been central to human rights law
since its origins.15
Second, situating political opinion within the refugee definition serves
as a reminder that our narrow focus here is on one ground of potential
persecution. In developing a new approach, it is vital to recall that much of
the work of determining whether one fits within the definition is done by
other elements of the definition, in this case particularly by the nexus
clause (“for reasons of”) and the “being persecuted” element (including
both serious harm and state protection). A number of the persistent
problems that arise in interpreting political opinion are better understood
as questions of nexus and of whether the harm in question is sufficiently
serious to reach the persecution threshold. Defining political opinion well
should alleviate these issues, but it is also vital to note that the focus here
is narrow, and some of these adjacent issues will not be solved by a clearer
framework for political opinion analysis.
Political opinion is not defined in the Refugee Convention or else-
where in international human rights law. Freedom from discrimination on
the ground of political opinion is enumerated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,16 and is specifically protected by the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In the ICCPR, the anti-dis-
crimination provision of the Universal Declaration is mirrored by Article
2.17 “Opinion” is specifically protected by Article 19:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media
of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may
15. See id. at 427; GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 5, at 70, 92-93.
16. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2 (Dec. 10,
1948) (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, with-
out distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction
shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country
or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing
or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”).
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”).
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therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be
such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (or-
dre public), or of public health or morals.18
Article 19 links freedom to hold opinions to freedom of expression.
The Article 18 protection for freedom of “thought, conscience, and relig-
ion”19 is also relevant to considering the place of political opinion in inter-
national human rights law. Yet none of these textual references directly
addresses the notion of political opinion as used in the Refugee
Convention.
Looking beyond the ICCPR text does not provide much assistance.
The Human Rights Committee has not been preoccupied with defining
either “opinion” or “political opinion.” In 2011, when the Committee un-
dertook the considerable task of issuing a new General Comment on Arti-
cle 19, the meaning of “opinion” received scant attention, undoubtedly
because the Committee, in looking to distill its jurisprudence of several
decades, found that defining opinion had not been problematic.20 The
General Comment states that “[n]o person may be subject to the impair-
ment of any rights under the Covenant on the basis of his or her actual,
perceived or supposed opinions. All forms of opinion are protected, in-
cluding opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or religious na-
ture.”21 The Rapporteur’s leading work on the General Comment
summarized the Committee’s broad approach to freedom of expression by
stating that “freedom of expression embraces every form of idea and opin-
ion capable of transmission to others, including views that may be deeply
offensive.”22
Consideration of the travaux pre´paratoires to the ICCPR is also not
particularly helpful in suggesting a definition. The travaux do note that
“[a]s the debate on this clause progressed, it became clear that freedom of
opinion and freedom of expression were not of the same character: the
former was purely a private matter, belonging as it did to the realm of the
mind, while the latter was a public matter, or a matter of human relation-
ship . . .”23 This comment echoes the question that has arisen in some
refugee cases, of whether an opinion must have a public aspect in order to
18. Id. at 178.
19. Id.
20. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of
Opinion and Expression, U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.2 (2010).
21. Id. ¶ 9.
22. Michael O’Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No.
34, 12:4 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 647, 647 (2012).
23. MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRE´PARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 378 (1987).
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be political; but it stops short of shedding light on the appropriate answer.
The travaux also show, in regard to the Article 18 protection for thought,
conscience, and religion, that it was agreed “[n]o restrictions of a legal
character. . .could be imposed upon man’s inner thought or moral con-
sciousness, or his attitude towards the universe of its creator: only external
manifestations of . . . belief might be subject to legitimate limitations.”24
All of this leads to the conclusion that political opinion is not a term of
art in refugee or international human rights law. It has been consistently
treated, over a sixty-year span, as a straightforward expression used in its
ordinary sense. The interpretive dilemmas it has posed within refugee law
are not mirrored elsewhere in international human rights law.
International human rights law is useful, however, in emphasizing two
ideas. First, political opinion is a subset of opinion more generally. Second,
political opinion is distinct from political expression, because political
opinion includes private and unexpressed thought. If it is not already evi-
dent, these points reinforce that interpreting political opinion, requires at-
tention to both words. Refugee decision-makers have primarily focused on
the limits of political. This makes sense based on international human
rights law, where opinion is clearly very broad and can cover anything. But
in seeking a new approach, there is something to be garnered from atten-
tion to opinion itself, as will become clearer in the discussions of case law
that follow.
Another starting point in any discussion of political opinion is Good-
win-Gill’s definition, adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward.25
Goodwin-Gill defined political opinion as “any opinion on any matter in
which the machinery of State, government and policy may be engaged.”26
This formulation has been central to the analysis of political opinion for
nearly twenty years, and has made important contributions: first to ensur-
ing broad interpretations and second to forming the parameters of debate.
Numerous courts have discussed this definition, but the Supreme Court of
Canada remains the only court to have explicitly adopted it. Within recent
Canadian jurisprudence, it is evident that even decision-makers bound by
this definition struggle to apply it consistently.
Two decades prior to Goodwin-Gill’s definition, Atle Grahl-Madsen
wrote that “the scope of the term ‘political opinion’. . . is not easily ascer-
tainable.”27 Grahl-Madsen did not reduce his discussion of the outer limits
of political opinion to a definitional form, but did launch his discussion
with the statement “it is apparent that it covers persecution of persons on
the simple ground that they are alleged or known to hold opinions con-
trary to or critical of the policies of the government or ruling party.”28
24. Id. at 355.
25. Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 746 (Can.).
26. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 5, at 87.
27. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 220
(1966).
28. Id.
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Grahl-Madsen’s analysis following this statement focused on how political
opinion was generally a “liberal” doctrine, and explored the ways in which
it might be limited. In doing so, he drew on international human rights
law, concluding that “a person may justly fear persecution ‘for reason of
political opinion’ in the sense of the Refugee Convention if he is
threatened with measures of a persecutory nature because of his exercise
of or his insistence on certain of the ‘rights’ laid down in the Universal
Declaration.”29
While the UNHCR Handbook published in 1992 did not define politi-
cal opinion,30 by 2010, when its Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Re-
lated to Victims of Organized Gangs was released, the UNHCR defined
political opinion, at least for that context, by drawing on Goodwin-Gill’s
work.31 As a result, the present UNHCR definition appears strongly influ-
enced by Goodwin-Gill and the jurisprudence that has engaged with his
work: “In UNHCR’s view the notion of political opinion needs to be un-
derstood in a broad sense to encompass ‘any opinion on any matter in
which the machinery of State, government, society, or policy may be
engaged.’”32
A final contribution to defining political opinion has been made by the
European Union’s Qualification Directive (“QD”). Article 10(1)(e) states
[T]he concept of political opinion shall, in particular, include the
holding of an opinion, thought or belief on a matter related to the
potential actors of persecution mentioned in Article 6 and to their
policies or methods, whether or not that opinion, thought or belief
has been acted upon by the applicant.33
Article 10(1)(e) must be read in conjunction with Article 6, which states
Actors of persecution or serious harm include:
(a) the State;
(b) parties or organisations controlling the State or a substantial
part of the territory of the State;
(c) non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that the actors men-
tioned in points (a) and (b), including international organisations,
29. Id. at 227.
30. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 80-86, U.N. DOC. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter
UNHCR Handbook].
31. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to
Victims of Organized Gangs, ¶ 45 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
4bb21fa02.html [hereinafter Guidance Note].
32. Id.
33. Council Directive 2011/95/EU, art. 10(1)(e), 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, 16 [hereinafter
Qualification Directive].
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are unable or unwilling to provide protection against persecution
or serious harm as defined in Article 7.34
This two-part definition of political opinion aims for breadth, but quite
possibly overreaches. At the very least, this definition offers a sharp an-
swer to the question of whether a political opinion must be about state or
government in some way. Article 6 paragraph (c), in combination with the
political opinion definition in Article 10, implies that a political opinion
will include any opinion “on a matter related to” a non-state actor from
whom the state cannot or will not offer protection. Paragraph (c) is ac-
cordingly almost infinitely broad. It is not clear whether this limit would
exclude any actual instances of risk or whether its limiting function is
strictly hypothetical. For example, forming the idea that “this group is go-
ing to harm me and no one can protect me” would appear to be a political
opinion under the QD. Paragraph (c) provides an illustration of how easy
it is for political opinion analysis to become so open-ended as to be
unwieldy.
This clumsy formulation does not offer much by way of definitional
limit, and is vastly broader than the Goodwin-Gill definition. Its contours
probably result from the relationship between Article 6 and the definition
of “actors of protection” set out in Article 7, which has been soundly criti-
qued on the basis that it pulls the QD away from the Refugee Convention
itself and erroneously suggests that non-state entities can assume responsi-
bility for basic human rights protections. It might be useful to draw from
the QD the idea that opinion can be expanded, or possibly even defined,
by equating it with “thought” or “belief.” This definition has not yet been
interpreted in detail by the leading courts that are now required to use it.
The contributions of international human rights law, Goodwin-Gill’s
definition, the UNHCR, and the new definition mandated by the Qualifi-
cation Directive all form part of the backdrop to the establishment of a
new approach to political opinion. None of these sources, however, pro-
vides a compelling answer to the tensions recurring in the jurisprudence.
The next step, therefore, is to look to the case law in order to understand
the setting in which these questions arise.
II.  MAJOR CASES
There are a handful of decisions in which courts have expounded defi-
nitions of or approaches to interpreting political opinion. The three most
detailed of these decisions are Ward,35 Gutierrez Gomez,36 and the com-
bined contribution of two successive rulings of the New Zealand Refugee
Status Appeals Authority in 2008 and 2010.37 In addition, the ruling of the
34. Id. at 15.
35. Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
36. Gutierrez Gomez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2000] UKIAT 00007,
[2001] 1 WLR 549.
37. Refugee Appeal No. 76044 [2008] NZAR 719 (N.Z.); Refugee Appeal No. 76339
[2010] NZAR 386 (R.S.A.A.).
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Supreme Court of the United States in Elias Zacarias38 is worth examining
because it has had a profound influence on American political opinion
jurisprudence and it illustrates the dilemmas that arise in adjudicating in
the absence of a definition.39 Each of these cases provides landmarks for
mapping the terrain of political opinion, and together they form a basis for
understanding how decision-making operates in the cases where no de-
tailed analysis of the political opinion ground takes place. This section,
therefore, presents these four cases in some detail. It concludes by consid-
ering what answers these cases offer to the central questions of what con-
stitutes an opinion, whether an opinion is political, and whether some
political opinions ought not be the basis for refugee protection.
Ward marks the first time that a senior court attempted to wrestle
with the parameters of political opinion.40 Mr. Ward was a member of an
Irish paramilitary group, the Irish National Liberation Party (“INLA”),
which, in the words of the Court, was “more violent than the Irish Repub-
lican Army.”41 He had been assigned to guard hostages and was subse-
quently ordered to kill them. Because he felt the hostages were
“innocent,” and as a matter of conscience he felt he could not kill them,
Ward instead released them. Once the INLA discovered this, Ward was
confined and tortured, and the group “sentenced” him to death. Ward
sought police assistance and as a result served a three-year prison sentence
for his role in the hostage-taking. Prior to his release, Ward expressed con-
cern about his safety after release. The Irish authorities responded by
helping him travel to Canada, where he claimed protection as a refugee.
The decision affirmed much of what is now accepted as the agreed
terrain of political opinion analysis: including, that a political opinion need
not have been expressed outright but can be perceived from actions,42 that
the opinion in question need not conform to the applicant’s true beliefs,43
and that this ground of persecution is relevant in cases where the persecu-
tor is not the state.44 All of these points have become part of the bedrock
of political opinion jurisprudence and are generally considered to be un-
controversial. The Ward court also took the view that political opinion
must be broadly understood; in doing so, the Court embraced Goodwin-
Gill’s definition of political opinion and explicitly rejected Grahl-Madsen’s
narrow 1966 formulation.45
Ward’s influential position warrants closer attention in order to under-
stand how it contributes to a jurisprudence that now requires clarification.
38. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
39. Courts referring to Elias Zacarias, which does not offer a specific definition of
“political opinion,” have generated a contradictory and overlapping jurisprudence that is dif-
ficult to reconcile. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
40. Ward, 2 S.C.R. 689.
41. Id. at 699.
42. Id. at 746.
43. Id. at 747.
44. See id. at 717.
45. Id. at 746.
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Even within Canada, where the Immigration and Refugee Board and the
Federal Court are bound to follow Ward, political opinion decisions have
lacked consistency.46 Beyond Canadian borders, aspects of the Ward ap-
proach have been actively disputed.47
Even though Ward clarifies and settles many questions about political
opinion, it generates uncertainty and controversy for two reasons: the facts
of the case and the Goodwin-Gill definition itself. Ward’s protection claim
was presented to the courts as a “particular social group” case. The Cana-
dian courts were, understandably, unwilling to define “particular social
group” in a way that would include terrorist organizations. The UNHCR
introduced the alternative political opinion claim at the final appellate
level. After reviewing the transcript of the original hearing, the Court
stated: “To Ward, who believes that the killing of innocent people to
achieve political change is unacceptable, setting the hostages free was the
only option that accorded with his conscience.”48 Ward never made this
statement. It was “imputed” to him, possibly by the agent of persecution,
and certainly by the Court. The INLA may simply have presumed Ward to
be disobedient, or subversive, or cowardly. It is important to the uncer-
tainty that follows from Ward that it did not matter what the INLA
believed.
Given the court’s formulation of Ward’s views, the Grahl-Madsen def-
inition of political opinion would not fit, as it requires that the opinion in
question be opposed to the state or ruling party. The idea that innocent
people should not be killed to achieve political change, however, is un-
doubtedly shared by many states and, indeed, by a great many individuals.
Abstracted in this way, the core of this “opinion” hardly seems political at
all. Insight is a valuable caution that abstraction generally reduces one’s
capacity to discern which opinions are political.
Knowing the definition that the Court adopted, the opinion it ana-
lyzed becomes clearer. By considering that the opinion was one “in which
the machinery of state or government and policy could be engaged,”49 the
Court signaled that what mattered about the view that innocent people
should not be killed as part of a political struggle was that it arose in the
context of a struggle. The machinery of state is very unlikely to be engaged
by such an opinion, aside from making law to reflect it and possibly to
prosecute those who disobey it, but it is likely to be engaged by the strug-
gle that provided context for the opinion.
The next case to fully canvass political opinion was Gutierrez Gomez,
decided by the United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal in 2000.
Ms. Gutierrez Gomez was a Colombian citizen and law student whose uni-
46. See, for example, the disparate approaches of the Federal Court and Federal Court
of Appeal in Klinko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 327
(Can.) and Femenia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1995] F.C. No. 1455
(Can.), each purporting to follow Ward.
47. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
48. Ward, 2 S.C.R. at 748.
49. Id. at 746.
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versity required her to provide free legal advice in a clinic setting. As part
of this work, she investigated the cases of a number of farmers who were
being extorted by armed men Gutierrez Gomez believed were members of
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (“FARC”). After as-
sisting the farmers, she was threatened and her university tutor was kid-
napped. Two of her student colleagues disappeared. The Tribunal held that
the FARC did not impute a political motive to Gutierrez Gomez because
“it seems clear they knew that she was a law student and knew the ad hoc
basis on which she had become involved in the investigations into their
extortion racket.”50 Because of this, the tribunal concluded that Gutierrez
Gomez was being threatened for reasons that were criminal and retalia-
tory, and her circumstances could be distinguished from those of a human
rights crusader working against guerilla extortion.51
The ruling in Gutierrez Gomez agreed with the now largely settled
views on political opinion, including that the doctrine must be interpreted
broadly, that it applies in the case of non-state actor persecution, that it
need not involve political action or activity, and that imputed opinions can
be the basis of protection. The tribunal also drew a connection between
the refugee context and protection for political views and freedom of con-
science in international human rights law. The analysis then focused on
non-state actors and on the outer limits of “political” types of opinions.
One of the most important aspects of this ruling was the tribunal’s
assessment that the Goodwin-Gill definition, “which places focus on the
machinery of state or government,” may not be “broad enough to encom-
pass every type of situation relating to non-state actors of persecution.”52
This view opens the way for an analysis of how far beyond government
and the state the realm of the political ought to extend. The tribunal set-
tled on an interpretation of “political opinion” that drew a line between,
on the one hand, “views which have a bearing on the major power transac-
tions relating to government taking place in a particular society” and, on
the other hand, “power-relationships at all levels of society.”53 This is a
crucial and finely graded distinction.
The tribunal built on this distinction with some illustrative examples:
“sexual politics” or the “politics of the family” would not be appropriate
subjects of protected political opinion unless they “in some way link up to
major power transactions that take place in government or government-
related sectors such as industry and the media.”54 By way of further illus-
tration, the tribunal drew on the House of Lords’ finding in Shah and Is-
lam, that the victims of domestic violence in that case were not being
50. Gutierrez Gomez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2000] UKIAT 00007 ¶ 69,
[2001] 1 WLR 549.
51. Id. ¶¶ 69-70.
52. Id. ¶ 33.
53. Id. ¶ 38.
54. Id.
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persecuted on the ground of political opinion,55 and further opined that
only in “very unusual circumstances” could it envision political opinion
being established at the purely domestic or interpersonal level.56 These
examples are particularly useful in understanding the tribunal’s interpreta-
tion, especially given the challenge that gender-related cases often pose to
political opinion analysis.
There is a shade of difference between this ruling and the Goodwin-
Gill definition, but only a shade. In introducing its definition, the tribunal
said that political opinions within the Convention concern “major power
transactions relating to government taking place in a particular society.” In
summarizing its ruling, the tribunal said only that the opinion in question
must relate to “the major power transactions relating to government tak-
ing place in that particular society.”57 One must assume that this summary
has, in fact, summarized, and that the tribunal required that political opin-
ions relate to major power transactions that in turn relate to government.
This is somewhat different from Goodwin-Gill’s focus on matters relating
to the machinery of state, government or policy, but the difference appears
to be more in analytic approach than underlying substance.
In reading the other aspects of the decision, the desire for a broader
ambit becomes clearer. For example, the tribunal emphasized that even
political opinions that are not protected by human rights norms may be
protected by the Refugee Convention,58 and that the non-state persecu-
tor’s motives need not be “purely political.”59 The idea that protection
may be required for opinions beyond human rights norms is provocative.
It reminds us that there is no restriction in international human rights on
the content of opinion, only on the extent to which expressions of opinion
are to be protected.
The Gutierrez Gomez tribunal also made several observations that
may or may not broaden the scope of its definition, but that provide help-
ful clarity regardless. The first of these is that “the political opinion
ground. . . is often a group-based phenomenon.”60 The second is that polit-
ical opinion must be given a broad interpretation, “but not one that is
entirely undifferentiated.”61 Third, the tribunal cautioned that not every
opinion imputed to someone by a non-state actor will necessarily be a po-
55. Id. (citing Islam (A.P.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, R v. Immigration
Appeal Tribunal & Another ex parte Shah (A.P.) (Conjoined Appeals) [1999] 2 AC 629
(HL) (appeal taken from Eng.)). This presentation of the case ignores the two-part under-
standing of persecution that ultimately results in protection for the claimants in that case: it
fails to ask whether Shah and Islam were (1) unable to receive state protection (2) on the
basis of their political opinions.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. ¶ 25.
59. Id. ¶ 22.
60. Id. ¶ 23.
61. Id. ¶ 27.
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litical opinion.62 Finally, the tribunal noted that the definition of political
is “malleable” and differs in different historical places and times.63 For this
reason, as the tribunal emphasized, “In consequence of the shifting bound-
aries of the political in different societies and at different periods neither is
it possible to identify any fixed categories of persons or bodies that will
qualify as political entities.”64 This statement probably goes too far, as it is
difficult to imagine a context in which politicians or government leaders
would not be considered political entities. The extent to which the political
sphere is understood to be malleable is certainly central to our inquiry,
and points to the insight that what counts as “political” will always be
determined by context.
Following this careful elaboration, the tribunal turned to the facts
before it, and concluded that Gutierrez Gomez was being threatened for
reasons that were criminal and retaliatory, and that her circumstances
could be distinguished from those of a human rights crusader working
against guerilla extortion.65 In other words, her personal convictions were
not strong. This conclusion again heightens focus on what ought to count
as opinion.
Gutierrez Gomez contributed a new definition of political opinion to
the jurisprudence and spent considerable time detailing its application. Po-
tential questions that remain following this case include whether this defi-
nition can be functionally distinguished from Goodwin-Gill’s, especially if
the facts and outcomes of each case are added into the mix. Regarding the
central questions, the Gutierrez Gomez ruling may possibly move political
opinion a bit further from the state than Ward did. It comes close to re-
quiring a public aspect to the opinion in question. In the Gutierrez Gomez
analysis, altruism, self-interest, and group or individualist assessments of
the opinion are irrelevant, but individual commitment to one’s ideas seems
to play a role. Finally, the case presents the question of whether acting in a
particular role, such as legal advocate, can ever be the basis for an imputed
political opinion.
The United Kingdom Supreme Court affirmed the Gutierrez Gomez
approach in its more recent ruling in RT (Zimbabwe).66 RT (Zimbabwe)
62. Id. ¶ 38.
63. Id. ¶ 40.
64. Id. ¶ 45.
65. Id. ¶¶ 69-70.
66. RT (Zim.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2012] UKSC 38, [2013] 1 AC 152.
RT was not a full canvass of political opinion because its facts were much closer to a tradi-
tional political opinion case. All four individuals in question were in fear because they lacked
any political opinion and thus they would not be able to demonstrate the requisite loyalty to
the Mugabe regime. The RT ruling contributes a strong and clear line of reasoning regarding
individuals with no political opinion. But given this starting point, it does not address the
vexing issue of the limits of the political opinion category, nor does it attempt to apply the
Gutierrez Gomez definition. At most, RT is helpful in clarifying that it is possible to have no
political opinion, even in highly polarized and politicized contexts. It might be possible to
extend this reasoning to the proposition that “having no political opinion” is distinct from
“neutrality,” but the judgment does not explicitly go this far.
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does not grapple with the meaning of political opinion to the same extent
as the other major cases in this section, but it does do two important
things. First, it elevates the Gutierrez Gomez reasoning to a final appel-
late-court level. Second, it demonstrates how political neutrality can be
analyzed as a political opinion.
The facts in RT come much closer to a classic political opinion case,
because the agent of potential persecution is the state. This case joined
four appeals by Zimbabwean nationals, who had each argued that they
risked persecution on the basis that they had no political opinions and thus
would not be able to demonstrate the requisite loyalty to the Mugabe re-
gime. This “no political opinion” question reaches a number of aspects of
the political opinion jurisprudence, and the court approached it from two
directions: whether it is persecutory to be required to feign support for a
political regime, and whether someone with no political opinion risks that
the regime will impute to them support for the opposition.67
The first issue drew heavily on the reasoning in the same Court’s HJ
ruling about gay men at risk of being persecuted.68 In that case, the ques-
tion of “discretion” loomed large, and the court drew on this parallel
strongly in analyzing political opinion.69 In approaching this question, the
court considered how political expression rights are framed internation-
ally, as well as how freedom of thought, conscience and religion are pro-
tected. The Court drew particularly on freedom of religion analysis, stating
It is true that much of the case-law and commentary is on freedom
of belief in the context of religion, rather than other kinds of be-
lief (whether political, philosophical or otherwise). But I see no
basis for distinguishing between the freedom to hold and express
different kinds of belief here.70
Building on this reasoning, the court concluded that “the right not to hold
the protected beliefs is a fundamental right which is recognized in interna-
tional and human rights law and . . . the Convention too.”71 The court
rejected the idea that a distinction could be drawn on the basis that some
individuals are more committed to their neutrality than others; rather,
67. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
68. HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010] UKSC 31,
[2011] 1 AC 596 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.).
69. In claims by gay men and lesbians, the issue of whether an individual is at risk of
being persecuted if they are able to “hide” (closet) their sexuality has had a long and igno-
minious history. It has now been settled in the United Kingdom and in Australia that a re-
quirement to live a closeted life is a human rights infringement. See id.; Appellant S395/2002 v
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473 (Austl.). For a
history of the “discretion” jurisprudence, see Jenni Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief:
Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and
the United Kingdom, 13 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 391 (2009).
70. RT (Zim.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2012] UKSC 38, ¶ 39, [2013] 1 AC
152.
71. Id. ¶ 42.
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there ought to be no difference between indifferent non-believers and
those whom the court names conscientious non-believers.72
In sum, the RT ruling contributes a strong and clear line of reasoning
regarding individuals with no political opinion. But given this starting
point, it does not address the vexing issue of the limits of the political
opinion category, nor does it attempt to apply the Gutierrez Gomez defini-
tion. At most RT is helpful in clarifying that it is possible to have no politi-
cal opinion, even in highly polarized and politicized contexts. It might be
possible to extend this reasoning to the proposition that “having no politi-
cal opinion” is distinct from “neutrality,” but the judgment does not ex-
plicitly go this far. The RT court’s use of human rights law, particularly of
human rights law beyond the political rights context, is also instructive.73
The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority has also pro-
duced a highly detailed analysis of political opinion, articulated over the
length of two decisions, which both merit attention because of their
breadth and depth. The first ruling was handed down in 2008, in the case
of an Alevi Kurdish woman from Turkey who feared being murdered by
family members in the name of honor.74 The authority held that she was at
risk of being persecuted because of her political opinion. The authority
opened its reasoning by stating that “gender is a primary way of signifying
relationships of power,”75 a starting point that puts the case on a collision
course with the ruling in Gutierrez Gomez.
The first step in the analysis was the examination of evidence about
the practice of honor killing, concluding that “[t]he observance of honour
[in Turkish society] is a societal concern and reflects the gendered inequal-
ity of power in that society.”76 The authority then proceeded to a gender-
sensitive interpretation of political opinion, drawing on a series of its own
earlier decisions. The most important contribution here is the statement
that “political opinion is not a matter of definition but depends on the
context of the case.”77 This approach is in sharp contrast to all of the other
leading cases. The word “government” is not mentioned at any point in
the analysis, and the focus is instead on how power is exercised in particu-
lar social contexts. For example:
In the particular context, a woman’s actual or implied assertion of
her right to autonomy and the right to control her own life may be
seen as a challenge to the unequal distribution of power in her
society and the structures which underpin that inequality. In our
view such situation is properly characterized as “political.”78
72. Id. ¶ 45.
73. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
74. Refugee Appeal No. 76044 [2008] NZAR 719 at ¶ 1, ¶ 28 (N.Z.).
75. Id. ¶ 71.
76. Id. ¶ 80.
77. Id. ¶ 83.
78. Id. ¶ 84.
262 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:243
The authority emphasized that gender identity is constructed in specific
“geographic, historical, political and socio-cultural contexts,” and that
such contexts provide an answer as to whether or not a person is at risk of
being persecuted for reasons of political opinion.79 The authority also
highlighted that a decision-maker must not inadvertently privilege a claim-
ant who can articulate her claim as political over one who does not iden-
tify the constructed and political nature of her situation.80
Given this analysis, the authority turned to the facts before it and
found that the claimant’s actions taken to end her relationship with her
husband demonstrated a political opinion within the Convention meaning.
In the authority’s words, her actions were a “challenge to inequality and
the structures of power which support it.”81
In a decision handed down almost two years later, the authority built
on this approach to political opinion and provided some crucial additional
guidance.82 In this second case, a Romanian citizen argued that he was
facing politically-motivated prosecution as a result of reporting on corrupt
activities by city officials. Here, the Authority affirmed its commitment to
a contextual approach without a core definition, arguing that “all-encom-
passing definitions are an unhelpful distraction. . . .”83 In regard to the
Goodwin-Gill definition in particular, the Authority assessed it as “too
broad to be of any meaningful assistance.”84 The authority then canvassed
international approaches to political opinion arguments in cases of corrup-
tion and criminal non-state actors, and persuasively argued that, in each
instance, contextual analysis prevailed over a definition-focused ap-
proach.85 In conclusion, the Authority ruled that, despite extensive evi-
dence of corruption in Romania, the applicant’s fears in this case were the
result of a “very personal fight which has nothing to do with the appel-
lant’s . . . actual or perceived political opinion.”86
Together these two cases are instructive about how an analysis that
does not begin with a definition can operate. Within the “context” box,
however, very few signposts are given. In each case there is extensive evi-
dence that certain problems, gender inequality and corruption respec-
tively, are deeply embedded in the societies being examined. In each case
the claimant had not expressed a political opinion overtly and had acted in
a way that primarily served personal interests. It was the case of alleged
state-actor persecution that failed. In considering the cases side-by-side, it
is useful to discern what distinguishes the first and leads to a successful
79. Id. ¶ 87.
80. Id. ¶ 86.
81. Id. ¶ 90.
82. Refugee Appeal No. 76339 [2010] NZAR 386 (R.S.A.A.).
83. Id. ¶ 87.
84. Id. ¶ 88.
85. Id. ¶¶ 91-103 (surveying the jurisprudence of Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Australia to examine the role of context in the Courts’ determinations).
86. Refugee Appeal No. 76339, [2010] NZAR ¶ 107.
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claim. The critical factor appears to be that the imputed political opinion
that women are equal and autonomous individuals aligns with well-estab-
lished human rights norms in opposition to broad society-wide patterns of
unequal treatment. It might be possible to use the factors of opposition to
authority and human rights norms as context markers, despite the author-
ity’s explicit rejection of any defining features.
The New Zealand Authority’s approach is important because it in-
troduces the possibility of jettisoning the quest for a definition. Its analysis
of political opinion hinges on power rather than on the state or govern-
ment, and in this way it shares something with the Gutierrez Gomez ap-
proach, despite the cases’ substantive disagreement about gender claims.
Because of the focus on context, this approach attunes to macro-level soci-
etal factors, rather that abstracting the substance of an opinion and analyz-
ing it. It also complicates the question of how to understand opinion, as
the authority imputes opinions to the claimants based on patterns of be-
havior over time, rather than a particular action as in Ward.
All five of these cases, with their disparate approaches, differ signifi-
cantly from Elias Zacarias,87 which was decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1991 and thus predates all of them. For the majority
of the Elias Zacarias Court, the question was whether Elias Zacarias was
at risk “for reasons of political opinion.”88 As the Court neither defined
“political opinion” nor grappled with interpreting “for reasons of,” it is
impossible to say whether Elias Zacarias’ claim failed because of a lack of
political opinion or a lack of nexus. For the dissenters, however, under-
standing “political opinion” was the central issue.89
Regardless of the majority’s intent, Elias Zacarias has become a
landmark case for United States political opinion jurisprudence. The ma-
jority’s stance, that political opinion is self-evident and need not be de-
fined, is provocative and contributes significantly to the quandary of
American political opinion cases.90
Subsequent political opinion rulings in the United States have looked
to the Court’s disposition of the case for guidance, and the absence of any
definition of political opinion has the effect of ensuring that the facts of
the case remain vital and are frequently discussed. Elias Zacarias was a
young man from Guatemala who had refused to join the insurgent forces
in the on-going conflict in that country, and had fled to the United States
because of the threat that the guerillas would persist in requesting his co-
operation. Elias Zacarias gave evidence that he did not want to join “be-
87. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
88. Id. at 479. Although the U.S. statutory rendition of “for reasons of” is “on account
of” political opinion, subsequent caselaw has not indicated any interpretive divergence from
the original text of the Convention. For purposes of the current analysis, the present Section
employs “for reasons of” when discussing U.S. caselaw.
89. Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In my opinion, the record in this case is more
than adequate to support the conclusion that this respondent’s refusal was a form of expres-
sive conduct that constitute the statement of a political opinion.”).
90. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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cause the guerillas are against the government and he was afraid that the
government would retaliate against him and his family if he did join the
guerillas.”91 The risk facing Elias Zacarias if returned to Guatemala was
not in dispute, but the proper analysis of the reasons for that risk divided
the Court.
The majority ruling emphasized that even a supporter of a guerilla
cause might have multiple reasons for resisting recruitment, and that Elias
Zacarias’ stated fear of government retaliation evinced the “opposite” of a
political motive on his part.92 The Court stated that there was no indica-
tion “that the guerillas erroneously believed that Elias-Zacarias’ refusal
was politically based.”93 Other important aspects of the reasoning were
that the analysis must focus on the victim’s political opinion, not the perse-
cutor’s; that “the mere existence of a generalized ‘political’ motive” for
forced recruitment to a guerilla force was insufficient to render resistance
to such recruitment a political matter;94 and that not taking sides in a po-
litical dispute is not “ordinarily” the expression of a political opinion.95
Finally, the majority concluded that the guerillas would harm Elias
Zacarias because of his refusal to fight alongside them, rather than be-
cause of any political opinion he may hold.96
Not surprisingly, given the approach focusing on engagement with the
facts rather than a definition-based assessment, the majority and dissenters
disagreed pointedly over the presentation of factual nuance in the case.
The dissenters asserted that “a simple desire to continue living an ordinary
life with one’s family . . . is the kind of political expression that the asylum
provisions of the statute were intended to protect.”97 This phrasing is
beautifully evocative and serves to express the nub of the problem that
still remains with political opinion jurisprudence almost a quarter century
later.
Overall, the Elias Zacarias ruling contributes to the consensus on po-
litical opinion through its acceptance that threats by non-state actors are
relevant, that political opinion may be gleaned from an individual’s con-
duct, and that while it is the victim’s political opinion that must be as-
sessed, it is what the persecutor believes, rather than the truth of the
opinion, that matters. Elias Zacarias contributes to uncertainty in the juris-
prudence through its fact-driven approach, its skepticism about diverse
motivations for an individual’s resistance, and its seeming rejection of neu-
trality as expressing a political opinion. The conclusion that risk would
come from Elias Zacarias’ refusal to fight with the guerillas, rather than
from the reason for that refusal, adds another layer of confusion to the
91. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 480.
92. Id. at 482.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 483.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 486.
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analysis. It demonstrates how easily analysis can slip from the essence of
political opinion to the other elements of the refugee definition, most
often the “for reasons of” nexus clause.
Considering this group of cases as a whole demonstrates why political
opinion appears nebulous. Among these leading cases, there is no agree-
ment about what political opinion means or about how to approach it.
Aside from RT (Zimbabwe), all of these cases arose in factual circum-
stances that have become the typical trouble spots of political opinion
analysis: claimants resisting criminal gangs, claimants acting as
whistleblowers, and instances of gender-based persecution. As these cases
illustrate, there has been much disagreement among national jurisdictions.
Thus, rather than providing guidance, these high profile cases illustrate the
need for clarification.
This need can be given specific form by considering what these major
cases contribute to the three central questions. On the matter of what con-
stitutes an opinion, these cases do a great deal to flesh out the importance
of “imputed” opinions and the challenge of an accurate analysis of imputa-
tion. In the Ward ruling, the court itself gives content to the opinion it
analyzes, with little attention to whether the agent of persecution would
have considered this content. In the Gutierrez Gomez ruling, the issue
presents as whether one’s opinion can be “read into” or “imputed” from a
particular role that one occupies.98 This case also raises the important
question of how strongly an opinion must be held: Ms. Gutierrez Gomez
fails in her claim for lack of strong conviction, and thus, reasons the tribu-
nal, for the implausibility of imputation.99 The issue is echoed in RT
(Zimbabwe), where the Supreme Court (UK) finds that strength of con-
viction ought not matter; indifferent neutrality is to be treated identically
to highly-committed neutrality.100 The New Zealand cases base imputa-
tion on patterns of behavior rather than on individual acts.101 And, most
problematically, the majority and dissent in Elias Zacarias disagree about
what to impute from an individual’s actions.102
On the question of whether an opinion is political, these cases disa-
gree about whether or not political opinion requires an engagement with
government or the state: the Elias Zacarias majority and RT (Zimbabwe)
do seem to require such a linkage, while Ward and Gutierrez Gomez sug-
gest such a linkage is unnecessary but deploy definitions that link back in
some way to government, policy, or the state.103 The New Zealand Au-
thority clearly rejects the need for such a linkage. In each of the cases,
context is vitally important in determining what is political, and for the
98. See Gutierrez Gomez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2000] UKIAT 00007 ¶
4, [2001] 1 WLR 549.
99. Id. ¶¶ 68-70.
100. See RT (Zim.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2012] UKSC 38, ¶  46,
[2013] 1 AC 152.
101. See discussion supra Section II.
102. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
103. See discussion supra Section II.
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New Zealand Authority context is everything.104 None of the cases, how-
ever, give guidance on how to assess context, and thus the analysis here
does not advance. The cases also introduce several sub-questions that deci-
sion-makers seem to use to analyze the content of “political.” For exam-
ple, the Ward court pays some attention to Ward’s altruism, the New
Zealand Authority pays attention to self-interest, and the Elias Zacarias
Court, the RT (Zimbabwe) Court, the New Zealand Authority, and the
Ward Court take into account the oppositional posture of the views in
question.
On the final question of whether some political opinions ought not be
protected because of their content, these cases make little direct contribu-
tion. But RT (Zimbabwe) and Gutierrez Gomez do introduce the idea of
using human rights standards to limit the analysis of political opinion.105
The paper now turns to consider how these dilemmas have played out
in areas of case law where significant clusters of political opinion decisions
have arisen. In these subsequent sections, the jurisprudence has not gener-
ally been as detailed as in the major cases, but the volume is higher, as the
rulings are closer to the first instance setting where any new framework of
analysis will meet its true test.
III.  CASE CLUSTERS RAISING IMPORTANT THEMES & QUESTIONS
The five case clusters in this section each present a particular type of
challenge or issue for the analysis of political opinion. The five clusters
involve: military conscientious objectors, people fleeing China’s one-child
policy, people in flight from criminal violence, people at risk because of
their whistleblowing activities, and circumstances where gender and politi-
cal opinion are linked. Each of these areas contribute one or more specific
points that must be weighed in answering the paper’s central questions.
A. Objections to Military Service
In 1966, when Atle Grahl-Madsen published his influential commen-
tary on the Refugee Convention, what he termed “evasion of military du-
ties” had already become a paradigmatic case concerning the political
opinion ground.106 The cases in this section squarely involve the state, and
also involve individuals who have articulated their views plainly: they have
objected to military service for reasons of conscience or principle.107 Ac-
cordingly, the questions of what counts as an “opinion” and whether the
opinion is “political” are easily answered. As Goodwin-Gill writes,
“[r]efusal to bear arms, however motivated, reflects an essentially political
opinion regarding the permissible limits of state authority; it is a political
104. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
105. See discussion supra Section II.
106. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 220-21.
107. Objections for reason of religion require a somewhat different analysis, as “relig-
ion” is itself a listed ground in the refugee definition.
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act.”108 The challenge lies beyond these points, and is squarely captured
by the Canadian Federal Court in Hinzman, where the Court notes that,
while freedom of thought, conscience, and religion are well-recognized in
international law, there is as yet no internationally recognized right to con-
scientious objection.109 Conscientious objection is, rather, “viewed as
more of a relative right.”110
This awkward expression gets at something important. Formulated as
an international human right, freedom of opinion is almost unrestrained,
and in matters of military service evasion or desertion, an opinion is
clearly political. These cases serve as a reminder that there is a potentially
wide range of political opinions that are morally repugnant (for example,
Holocaust deniers) or embrace illegal acts (for example, support for a po-
litical assassination). Faced with the adjudicative challenge presented by
conscientious objectors, courts in many jurisdictions have turned to inter-
national human rights standards to determine the ambit of this “relative
right,” in other words, to determine which subset of political opinions
merit protection.111
Setting aside conscientious objection on religious grounds, which has
somewhat different contours, the consensus view on conscientious objec-
tion is that being compelled to serve, or being punished for desertion or
evasion, is generally not persecution within the meaning of the Refugee
Convention. In many of these cases, the crux of the analysis addresses
whether the consequence of not serving is sufficiently serious harm to
meet the persecution standard.112 However, in cases where the individual
objects to performing specific acts or participating in specific conflicts, the
analysis often centers on whether the political opinion ground is actually
met. Much recent case law has therefore concerned defining the scope of
conscientious objections that will attract refugee protection. Examples in-
clude: Zolfagharkhani, where an Iranian citizen objected to being required
to participate in chemical warfare;113 Hinzman, where an American vol-
unteer soldier objected to participating the war in Iraq;114 Krotov, where a
Russian conscript objected to fighting in the Chechen war;115 and Ramos-
Vasquez, where an Honduran national deserted after being ordered to ex-
ecute a friend who had also deserted.116 In these cases, the issue is not
108. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 5, at 111.
109. Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2006] F.C. 420, ¶¶
206-07 (Can. Ont.).
110. Id. ¶ 211.
111. See id.
112. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 5, at 269-70.
113. Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration), [1993] 3 F.C. 540
(Can. C.A.) (judicial review successful).
114. Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2010] FCA 177
(Can. Ont. C.A.). Hinzman was ultimately found not to be a refugee.
115. Krotov v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] EWCA (Civ) 69 (Eng.) (judi-
cial review successful).
116. Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 1995) (judicial review successful).
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whether the risk the individual faces is persecutory, but, rather, whether
an objection to military service in highly specific circumstances expresses
the type of political opinion that merits attention.
The dividing line between successful and unsuccessful conscientious
objector claims in these circumstances has turned on the likely required
conduct of the individual, the characteristics of the conflict in question,
and the consequences for evasion or desertion. This approach risks inter-
twining analysis of “opinion” with analysis of “persecution,” but remains
instructive. The English Court of Appeal in Krotov demonstrates how
these aspects are intertwined:
[W]hile it must be acknowledged that the Convention itself is si-
lent as to conscientious objection and the norms of international
law, I consider that the terms of the Handbook and court deci-
sions have recognised a point at which punishment for objection
to participation in a particular conflict on grounds of its legality
may properly be regarded as establishing persecution for the pur-
poses of the Convention.
The basis upon which they have done so is not by recognition
of an internationally accepted right of (general or partial) consci-
entious objection (see Sepet & Bulbul supra) or by categorisation
of such a stance as ipso facto protected under the express terms of
the Convention, but by treating a genuine conscientious refusal to
participate in a conflict in order to avoid participating in inhumane
acts required as a matter of state policy or systemic practice, as
amounting to an (implied or imputed) political opinion as to the
limits of governmental authority, which thereby attracts the protec-
tion of the Convention. . . .117
The UNHCR Handbook similarly states that “not every conviction, genu-
ine though it may be, will constitute sufficient reasons for claiming refugee
status,”118 which clearly implies that some convictions, themselves political
opinions, will constitute sufficient reasons. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit similarly opined:
Where a nation espouses democracy and the rule of law, desertion
may be the most practical way of politically dissenting from mili-
tary practices which do not conform to the stated national policy.
If a soldier deserts in order to avoid participating in acts con-
demned by the international community as contrary to the basic
rules of human conduct, and is reasonably likely to face persecu-
tion should he return to his native country, his desertion may be
said to constitute grounds for asylum based on political opinion.119
117. Krotov, [2004] EWCA (Civ) ¶¶ 45-46 (emphasis added).
118. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 30, ¶ 171.
119. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 864 (emphasis added).
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Here again, it is clear that the desertion is conceptualized as expressing a
particular political view, which, because of its content, may attract protec-
tion under the Refugee Convention. The decision-maker, therefore, must
parse the reasons for desertion to separate protected from unprotected
political opinion.
Given the need to examine the particular content of these political
opinions, in order to determine whether they merit protection, courts have
turned to internationally articulated standards in both human rights law
and humanitarian law. In Krotov, the English Court of Appeal grappled
with determining which body of international law would provide the most
appropriate guidance, and found that international humanitarian law was
preferable to international human rights law for evaluating conduct in con-
flict situations.120 Two points raised by these cases are instructive to this
paper’s analysis. The first is whether it is appropriate to say that some
political opinions ought not be the basis for refugee protection. The sec-
ond is the idea that other international legal standards beyond the defini-
tion of “opinion” itself can contribute to delimiting the relevant opinion
within refugee law.
B. Flight from Extreme Applications of China’s One-Child Policy
The one-child policy cases demonstrate that the question of what
counts as a political opinion has been settled in completely opposite ways
in different jurisdictions. This is a serious problem that any new approach
must be able to address. People in flight from extreme applications of the
People’s Republic of China (“PRC’s”) one-child policy have in some cases
been found to be expressing a political opinion through their disagreement
with the policy, and in other cases have not. There is little disagreement
with the idea that the extreme or rogue localized applications of the policy
that include forced sterilization and forced abortion fit within the ambit of
persecution.121
The breadth of decision-making can be summarized as follows. In
Australia and New Zealand, well-regarded decision-makers decided early
on that flight from the one-child policy did not constitute political opin-
ion.122 People were opposed to the policy, but opposition within the con-
fines of the family, or evidenced only by having additional children, did
120. Krotov, [2004] EWCA (Civ) ¶ 38 (“It is in my view preferable to refer in this
context to ‘basic rules of human conduct’ or ‘humanitarian norms’ rather than to ‘abuse of
human rights’, at least unless accompanied by the epithet ‘gross’: cf. the observations of Lord
Bingham quoted above. That is because human rights really concern rights enjoyed by all at
all times, whereas humanitarian rules concern rights which protect individuals in armed con-
flicts. Most Conventions and other documents which provide for the protection of human
rights (a) include a far wider variety of rights than the rights to protection from murder,
torture and degradation internationally recognised as set out above; (b) in any event, contain
safeguards which exclude or modify the application of such rights in time of war and armed
conflict: see generally the approach set out in Detter.”).
121. Id.
122. Regarding Australia, see A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1997]
HCA 4 (Austl.), where political opinion received scant attention, the central issue was
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not amount to political opinion.123 Despite this, a number of more recent
lower-level decisions in Australia have found that such claimants were at
risk of being persecuted because of their political opinions; however, none
of these decisions comment on the meaning of political opinion.124 Cana-
dian jurisprudence occupies a middle ground divided on gender lines. In
Canada, women in flight from extreme application of the one-child policy
were found in 1993 to be members of a particular social group, and this
line of reasoning has generally been followed in lieu of engaging in politi-
cal opinion analysis.125 In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada skirted the
issue in Chan, with Justice LaForest stating in a vociferous dissent that: “I
leave it for another case to resolve whether the action itself of having a
child can constitute, in the words of Goodwin-Gill ‘. . .an opinion on any
matter in which the machinery of state, government, and policy may be
engaged.’”126 While recent Canadian cases involving female claimants
have generally followed the particular social group route, cases with male
claimants or heterosexual couple co-claimants have proceeded on the
ground of political opinion.127
The United States occupies the other end of the spectrum. The Ameri-
can Immigration and Nationality Act was amended in 1996, expressly over-
ruling the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ruling in Matter of Chang that
flight from application of this policy could not be political opinion.128 As a
consequence, political opinion claims are now the norm in the United
States for individuals in flight from rogue applications of the one-child
policy.
The law is reasonably settled in each of these jurisdictions, but, from
an international point of view, confusion reigns. On a case-by-case basis,
clever lawyers can of course distinguish any one case from the next, but
the point remains that any new approach to political opinion should be
whether such claimants were members of a particular social group. Regarding New Zealand
see Refugee Appeal No. 3/91 Re ZWD [1992] NZRSAA (20 Oct. 1992) (N.Z.).
123. Cases of individuals who organize public protest activities against the policy, or
who write to politicians, do not present the same issues.
124. See, e.g., RRT Case No. 1102903 [2011] RRTA 685 (9 Aug. 2011) (Austl.); RRT
Case No. 0902142 [2009] RRTA 447 (12 May 2009) (Austl.); RRT Case No. 0806444 [2009]
RRTA 146 (16 Feb. 2009) (Austl.); RRT Case No. 071910232 [2008] RRTA 24 (22 Feb. 2008)
(Austl.).
125. See Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration), [1993] 2 F.C. 314
(Can.).
126. Chan v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, ¶ 93
(Can.). This example makes it particularly clear how removing the political backdrop (that is,
the PRC’s one-child policy) robs the question of meaning.
127. Particular social group cases with female claimants include Chi v. Canada (Minis-
ter of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] F.C.T. 126 (Can.) and Tan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), [2004] F.C. 1280 (Can.); political opinion cases involving couples
include Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Ye, [2013] F.C. 634 (Can. Ont.)
and RPD File No. VB1-03180/VB1-03183, 2012 CanLII 100143 (Can. I.R.B.).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1996). This was introduced by the Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
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able to give a clearer answer to the question of whether fleeing the appli-
cation of extreme versions of China’s one child policy evinces a political
opinion. The cases diverge on how to “impute” an opinion and on the
definition of political. Moreover, because the case law is settled in these
jurisdictions, contemporary cases rarely analyze or define political opin-
ion, so it is challenging to unearth the crux of the problem.
C.  Whistleblowers
In English-speaking jurisdictions, there is now a considerable body of
case law assessing claims brought by individuals who are at risk for report-
ing on corrupt practices, and who either failed to find redress or to compel
the state to enforce the law. These cases are grouped together in a
“whistleblower” category, but this is not a term of art; the term is used to
refer to cases where individuals reported on corrupt practices or sought to
have the law enforced. The Council of Europe definition of whistleblowers
as “concerned individuals who sound an alarm in order to stop wrongdo-
ings that place fellow human beings at risk”129 is broader than the factual
scenarios present in refugee case law. In particular, the refugee cases in
this group do not include any instances of whistleblowing against private-
sector actors.130
The whistleblowing cases present a particular dilemma for decision-
makers. The question of whether a whistleblower is expressing a political
opinion can be vexing: on one hand, the people involved are each seeking
to engage the state in some way; but, on the other, the demand made of
the state (that is, that the law be enforced) would be considered mundane
in a Western liberal democracy (that is, in the places where these claims
are typically being adjudicated). While the label “whistleblower” evokes
the Edward Snowdens and Julian Assanges of the world, the comparison is
misleading, as the protections benefitting those two at present are not the
results of refugee-status determination processes. Their circumstances
share little with the facts that typify these cases. Rather, these cases re-
quire decision-makers to re-conceptualize the quotidian request that the
law be enforced.
Overall, the whistleblower cases yield several insights. There is gen-
eral agreement that in some, but not all, circumstances, protesting against
governmental corruption will evince a political opinion. As in the military-
objector and one-child policy cases, this conclusion is reasonably easy to
reach because the state is always present.131 Courts also generally agree
that pervasive corruption is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a
129. Resolution on Protection of “Whistle-Blowers,” EUR. PARL. RES. 1729 (2010).
130. Private sector actors are clearly a relevant whistle-blower target. See, e.g., Heinisch
v. Germany, App. No. 28274/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); Guja v. Moldova, App. No. 14277/04,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
131. The possible complexity that would be introduced if private actors were involved
was alluded to by the Court in Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Whistleblowing against one’s supervisors at work is not, as a matter of law, always an exer-
cise of political opinion. However, where the whistle blows against corrupt government offi-
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finding that whistleblowing is a political opinion. Finally, in grappling with
the meaning of political, decision-makers in these cases found that actions
that are self-interested, private, or individual were less likely to be consid-
ered to show a political opinion than those that were altruistic, group-
based, or public. In this group of cases, the question of what constitutes an
opinion does not arise because the whistleblowing action fits this criterion.
In an indirect way, these cases do potentially address the question of
whether some political opinions ought not to attract refugee protection.
Courts generally agree that in some circumstances whistleblowing may
constitute an actual or imputed political opinion. In the United States, the
Ninth Circuit has stated “where the whistle blows against corrupt govern-
ment officials, it may constitute political activity sufficient to form the ba-
sis of persecution on account of political opinion.”132 Similarly, the
Australian Federal Court summarized its canvass of the jurisprudence by
concluding that “exposure of corruption can, in a wide range of circum-
stances, lead to political persecution.”133 The English Court of Appeal as-
serted that an imputed political opinion may exist “where an individual is
perceived to be on the side of law and order in a country where that has
broken down.”134 Given this consensus, discrepancies arise in articulating
the limits of the admittedly “wide range of circumstances,” because there
is also broad support for the idea that simply reporting a crime or acting as
a witness is not a political opinion necessitating Convention protection.135
The starting point for decision-makers is often to examine the extent
to which the corruption in question permeates the state. It is more likely
that whistleblowing will evince a political opinion when corruption per-
vades the state, or when the state is unable or unwilling to take the action
the whistleblower requests. This was a decisive factor in the Rodas Castro
ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where
a police officer was at risk of retribution because of his persistent efforts to
report the drug-trafficking activities of his superiors to both national and
international authorities in Guatemala.136 The court noted that “the re-
cord is replete with evidence documenting substantial and pervasive cor-
cials, it may constitute political activity. ”). I have not encountered a case in my research that
has not involved the state.
132. Grava, 205 F.3d at 1181.
133. Zheng v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 670, ¶ 32
(23 Aug. 2000) (Austl.).
134. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2003] EWCA (Civ) 175 ¶ 23 (appeal taken
from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.).
135. See, e.g., Zheng, [2000] FCA 670, ¶ 21 (“The general position is that opposition to
criminal activity per se is not political expression.”); Yoli v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
& Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No. 1823, ¶ 27 (Can. Ont.) (“Refusing to participate in crimi-
nal activity, witnessing and/or reporting a crime have generally been found by this Court not
to be in and of themselves expressions of political opinion attracting Convention refugee
protection. . .”); see also Suarez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2002] EWCA (Civ) 722
(appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.).
136. Rodas Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 104 (2nd Cir. 2010).
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ruption in the [police] and the Guatemalan government more broadly.”137
The Ninth Circuit has held that there is a key distinction to be drawn be-
tween whistleblowing activity that is “directed toward a governing institu-
tion” and that which is directed “only against individuals whose corruption
was aberrational. . .”138 Similarly, the Second Circuit has stated that deci-
sion-makers must distinguish “whether the persecutor was attempting to
suppress a challenge to the governing institution, as opposed to a chal-
lenge to isolated, aberrational acts of greed or malfeasance.”139
This analytic starting point is also important in decisions outside the
United States. For example, in Y, the Australian Federal Court noted that
a key factor to consider was “that there was corruption throughout the
whole of the Government services including Brazil’s police force”;140 the
Canadian court focused on this factor in Klinko,141 as did the English
Court of Appeal in Storozhenko.142
Even in circumstances where extensive corruption exists, however,
whistleblowing has not been found in every case to constitute a manifesta-
tion of political opinion. The distinction has been clearly stated by the En-
glish Court of Appeal in Suarez: “it is wrong to assume that all actions
aimed at preventing the exposure of criminal activities in such a [corrupt]
society can be characterised as imputing a political opinion to the wit-
ness.”143 The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeal Authority held that
despite a high level of pervasive corruption in Romania, “a blanket deter-
mination cannot be made that every transaction . . . between an individual
and a public official is tainted by corruption.”144 In Storozhenko, the En-
glish Court of Appeal carefully weighed evidence about the Ukraine, and
determined that the state was making some progress against corruption
that was relevant to the case at hand.145
It is certainly correct, given the individual focus of refugee determina-
tion, to reject a uniform approach to whistleblowers in corrupt states. Fur-
ther, the United States Second Circuit has also cautioned against the
opposite approach of making systemic corruption a strict requirement for
considering whistleblowing as a political opinion:
The fact that the protests organized by Yu challenged corruption
at a single workplace does not render the corruption categorically
137. Id. at 101.
138. Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2000).
139. Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 548 (2nd Cir. 2005).
140. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Y [1998] FCA 515 at 7 (Austl.).
141. See Klinko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 327,
¶¶ 4-5, ¶¶ 34-35 (Can.).
142. Storozhenko v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2001] EWCA (Civ) 895 ¶¶ 28-
29 (appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.).
143. Suarez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 722 ¶ 46 (appeal
taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.).
144. Refugee Appeal No. 76339 [2010] NZAR 386 ¶ 7 (R.S.A.A.).
145. Storozhenko, [2001] EWCA (Civ) ¶¶ 28-29.
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aberrational without regard to the nature of Yu’s conduct. In sev-
eral ways, Yu’s conduct is typical of political protest (and may
have been perceived as such by the authorities).146
In tandem, these parallel cautions lead to the heart of this issue: what spe-
cific and individual indicators do decision-makers look for in assessing po-
litical opinion in whistleblowing circumstances, and are these indicators
sufficient to provide predictable and consistent decisions?
While no one factor looms as large in the existing case law as the ex-
tent of corruption, a number of other ideas are present. One factor that
has been decisive in several cases is whether an individual is acting solely
in his or her own interests. Though this factor ultimately would not be a
useful addition to a new definition of political opinion, it does seem to
have a useful role for many decision-makers in the whistleblower cluster.
Indeed, one could argue that the Council of Europe definition147 of
whistleblowing requires a degree of altruism. There are two aspects to
consider. First, whether the opinion is altruistic, as in Storozhenko, where
the claimant’s initial confrontation with the police began from his anger
that a police car had run down a child. The second aspect is whether the
opinion in question relates to an individual or a group. Applicants who
rallied a group to action have been more likely to be seen as having ex-
pressed a political opinion than those who are the sole beneficiaries of
their actions. It was notable, for example, that Mr. Yu was acting on behalf
of others in his work unit (which did not receive its wages), despite having
been paid himself.148 In Zhang, a decisive factor was that the claimant
rallied other small business owners to work with him in opposing extortion
by local officials.149 This criterion has also worked against claimants,
where personal interests are perceived to be the motivating factor. For
example, the New Zealand Authority found that the Romanian claimant
discussed above was acting solely in his own interests:
146. Yu v. Holder, 693 F.3d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 2012).
147. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
148. See Yu, 693 F.3d at 299 (“[T]he record indicates that Yu had no personal, financial
motive to oppose the corruption, undertook to vindicate the rights of numerous other per-
sons as against an institution of the state (a state-owned factory), and suffered retaliation by
an organ of the state—the police.”).
149. Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 547 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“He argues that the dispute
became political when he decided to marshal support from similarly afflicted business owners
and to attempt to publicize and criticize endemic corruption extending beyond his own case.
Zhang argues that at this stage his efforts were transformed from a purely self-interested
attempt to shield his business from greedy bureaucrats into a challenge to the legitimacy of
the municipal government; this was the point at which the government closed his business,
detained and beat him, and sent public security officials to his home to discuss “his opinion of
them.” On Zhang’s theory, then, what began as an attempt by government officials to extort
him became an attempt to repress his challenge to the government’s legitimacy. It is clear
under Osorio that if Zhang can show that the government acted with the latter motive, his
claim is “covered under ‘political opinion’ ” within the meaning of § 1101(a)(42).”).
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The appellant acted in self-interest both when getting into the HY
group and when leaving it. Nothing he has done can sensibly be
described as a political act or expression of a political opinion.150
Some decision-makers have drawn a related distinction between pub-
lic and private actions. The English Court of Appeal, in ruling against Mr.
Storozhenko, concluded that the matter was one of “the private activities
of a private citizen seeking to bring an individual police officer to jus-
tice.”151 The fact that public actions are more easily seen to evince a politi-
cal opinion may account for why whistleblowing journalists have been
readily perceived as expressing political views: they have done their
whistleblowing in public.152
There is a higher level of convergence among the whistleblower cases
than in the two groups that follow, and this convergence reveals some use-
ful insights; however, it would be going too far to suggest that an interna-
tional approach to cases like these has already emerged. Klinko and
Storozhenko demonstrate divergent approaches, each in cases where the
respective courts have set out explicitly to build a definitional framework
for political opinion analysis.
Klinko was handed down by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in
2000.153 It involved a businessman from the Ukraine who, along with five
others, made a complaint against the widespread corruption of customs
officers and police.154 Klinko shows how the Ward approach to political
opinion applies in a whistleblower situation. Grappling with the somewhat
difficult idea of engaging the machinery of state, the court says: “I empha-
size that such test does not require that the state or machinery of state be
actually engaged in the subject-matter of the opinion. It is sufficient in
order to meet the test that the state or machinery of state ‘may be en-
gaged.’”155 Following this approach, the Court considered that the evi-
dence demonstrating that the Ukrainian government was actively fighting
corruption showed that “. . .the machinery of government in the Ukraine
was actually ‘engaged’ in the subject matter of Mr. Klinko’s complaint.”156
150. Refugee Appeal No. 76339 [2010] NZAR 386 ¶ 107 (R.S.A.A.).
151. Storozhenko v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2001] EWCA (Civ) 895 ¶ 30
(appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.); see also Zheng v Minister for Immigration
& Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 670, ¶ 42 (23 Aug. 2000) (Austl.).
152. See Hayrapetyan v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Minister for
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Y [1998] FCA 515 (Austl.).
153. Klinko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 327
(Can.).
154. The reasoning in the case is partially devoted to overruling an earlier Canadian
decision and so the route it takes is a bit circuitous. The FCA overruled Femenia, which had
held that a whistleblower was not expressing a political opinion because that state was not
“engaged” in police corruption, and therefore a complaint about such corruption did not fit
within the Ward definition.
155. Klinko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 327, ¶ 33
(Can.).
156. Id. ¶ 35.
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The Court also established that a political opinion need not be in opposi-
tion to the government, and concluded by saying: “Where, as in this case,
the corrupt elements so permeate the government as to be part of its very
fabric, a denunciation of the existing corruption is an expression of ‘politi-
cal opinion.’”157 With this conclusion, the Canadian Court goes farther
than most others by embracing the idea that in cases of pervasive corrup-
tion, all whistleblowing evinces political opinion.158
Storozhenko is an important contrast to Klinko, because Mr.
Storozhenko also came from the Ukraine, and the ruling was handed
down just one year later by the English Court of Appeal.159 The cases
were decided against the same contextual background. Mr. Storozhenko
had been assaulted by a police officer and his persistent efforts to report
this crime had led to harassment, physical attacks and threats. His engage-
ment with the police began from an altruistic impulse. Mr. Klinko’s cir-
cumstances were less personally emotive, however, as he sought out a
group to join in his protest against corrupt officials.160
The evidence before the English court concerning the Ukraine was
similar to that reviewed by the Canadian courts, showing extensive corrup-
tion, as well as serious governmental efforts to combat it. The English
court also gave serious consideration to the Ward ruling and the Goodwin-
Gill definition. However, Mr. Klinko was seen as expressing a political
opinion,161 while Mr. Storozhenko was not.162 These outcomes are diffi-
cult to reconcile. The Storozhenko Court asserted a distinction from
Klinko on the basis that Mr. Klinko had complained to a regional author-
ity;163 however, Mr. Storozhenko had also made a formal complaint, and
had done so more than once. The Storozhenko Court also looked to the
evidence of the Ukrainian government’s fight against corruption and con-
cluded that this meant corruption was not pervasive, and thus the situation
differed from Klinko.164
Neither of these distinctions is particularly persuasive. It is easier to
accept that the English Court of Appeal was seeking to disagree with the
Canadian Court without saying so directly. This disagreement is important
to the objective of moving whistleblower political opinion analysis
forward.
Whistleblowing is an area that has received some attention in interna-
tional human rights law, where it has been considered as a matter of free-
dom of expression. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
157. Id. ¶ 36.
158. Id.
159. See Storozhenko v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2001] EWCA (Civ) 895 ¶
30 (appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.).
160. Klinko, 3 F.C. ¶ 4.
161. Id. ¶ 35, ¶ 40.
162. See Storozhenko, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 895 ¶¶ 51-52.
163. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
164. Id. ¶ 50.
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Rights has outlined a series of factors to be weighed in assessing whether a
whistleblowing action falls within a sphere of protected expression.165 It is
difficult to directly adapt these factors to the refugee law context for two
reasons. First, the Refugee Convention’s drafters explicitly chose the term
“opinion” rather than “expression,” despite freedom of expression being
well-known at the time. The canvass of relevant human rights elements in
the opening section of this paper demonstrated that the principal distinc-
tion between these two freedoms in the human rights realm is that “ex-
pression” is inherently limited, while “opinion” is not. Second, because the
ECHR’s limiting factors contemplate whistleblowing against private ac-
tors, and reach to areas that would logically come under other aspects of
the refugee definition such as “persecution.”166
What is analytically helpful about drawing on freedom of expression
analysis in human rights law is the idea that a political opinion (for exam-
ple, whistleblowing) may not have the same unlimited characteristic as an
opinion full stop. Further, it is helpful to consider that whistleblowing is,
by definition, always a question of both expression and opinion. In other
words, in the whistleblowing cases, the political opinion in question is al-
ways expressed rather than imputed. Unfortunately, the ECHR’s analytic
factors do not allow us to avoid the conclusion that the decision-makers in
Klinko and Storohozenko were at odds with one another; they do not pro-
vide a distinction between these two cases. This does not mean, however,
that a new set of limiting factors may not be useful in the whistleblowing
context. It may also simply be the case that any set of criteria will require
us to conclude that at least one of these cases was wrongly decided.
In sum, the whistleblowing cases are important because their number
is increasing, and they raise questions that a new approach must answer.
Treating corruption as an important but not conclusive factor seems in-
sightful in determining the limits of political. The questions of altruism,
group orientation, and public orientation seem useful within this cluster,
but their utility falls away when they are transported to the two case clus-
ters that follow.
D.  Fleeing Criminal Violence
The final two case clusters are areas where the state is not necessarily
central to the analysis. These clusters, therefore, allow for a focus on the
question of what ought to constitute a political opinion. The case cluster
involving flight from violent criminal groups is the largest of all the clus-
ters, and contains the most diverse array of cases. The groups in question
include drug cartels, street gangs, insurgent guerilla groups, and even the
Taliban, a group that both defies categorization and does not need it. The
165. The factors are: the public interest in the information disclosed; whether there
were alternate channels for this disclosure; the authenticity of the disclosed information;
whether the applicant acted in good faith; the detriment to the employer; and the severity of
the sanction. See Heinisch v. Germany, App. No. 28274/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); Guja v.
Moldova, App. No. 14277/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
166. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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preponderance of claims of this nature prompted the UNHCR to issue a
guidance note on claims “relating to victims of organized gangs” in 2010,
in which the organization remarks that there is an increasing number of
these claims, “especially in the context of Central America.”167 From the
point of view of legal analysis, there is little to distinguish a gang from any
other organized group that operates outside the law, is frequently involved
in criminal activity, has a code of membership or a group ethos, and exer-
cises significant power within its social setting such that its threats are
meaningful. It is clear, therefore, that the UNHCR intended its guidance
to be relevant in these cases.
One indicator of the analytic difficulty of these cases is that three of
the influential decisions discussed above fit within the group: Elias
Zacarias, Ward, and Gutierrez Gomez each involve a claimant at risk from
a violent group.168 As these three cases offer divergent approaches in va-
rying jurisdictions, it is not surprising that the global jurisprudence is
somewhat incoherent. The set of rulings on claimants fleeing violent
groups reflects all of the issues presented by the leading cases; it also illus-
trates that these rulings have left many questions unanswered, even within
the jurisdictions where they are controlling.
The UNHCR Guidance Note begins from the problem of unchecked
gang violence, and thus is not primarily directed towards clarifying politi-
cal opinion analysis; nevertheless, it serves to introduce a number of the
questions that need to be addressed.169 Starting from Goodwin-Gill’s defi-
nition of political opinion, the Guidance Note states that
In certain contexts, expressing objections to the activities of gangs
or to the State’s gang-related policies may be considered as
amounting to an opinion that is critical of the methods and poli-
cies of those in power, and thus to constitute a “political opinion”
within the meaning of the refugee definition.170
The analysis in the Guidance Note is focused on situations where the gang
in question is in a position to exercise state-like power in at least some part
of a country.171 This focus facilitates a political opinion analysis, but only if
167. Guidance Note, supra note 31. Interestingly the Guidance note does not report
data in support of this assertion.
168. See discussion supra Section II.
169. The Guidance Note assesses membership in a particular social group as a first po-
tential nexus for protection in gang violence situations.
170. Guidance Note, supra note 31, ¶ 46.
171. Id. ¶ 47 (“It is important to consider, especially in the context of Central America,
that powerful gangs, such as the Maras, may directly control society and de facto exercise
power in the areas where they operate. The activities of gangs and certain State agents may
be so closely intertwined that gangs exercise direct or indirect influence over a segment of the
State or individual government officials. Where criminal activity implicates agents of the
State, opposition to criminal acts may be analogous with opposition to State authorities. Such
cases, thus, may under certain circumstances be properly analysed within the political opin-
ion Convention ground. Or, conversely, advocacy in favour of the rule of law may be consid-
ered a political opinion.”).
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the government or the state is necessary for an opinion to be considered
political. Many cases of individuals fleeing criminal groups fall into a
murky in-between position where the group is not state-like, but where
state protection is not possible. For example, the cases of Elias Zacarias,
Ward, and Gutierrez Gomez probably would not be considered to involve
gangs exercising “de facto . . . power” or which “directly control soci-
ety,”172 because in all of these circumstances the government remained in
control of the country and played its part in the story of the case. The
potential for violent groups to assume state functions, and therefore facili-
tate a political opinion analysis, is also signaled in the unusual approach to
political opinion taken in the European Union’s Qualification Direc-
tive.173 Equating the gang with the state facilitates political opinion analy-
sis only if one begins from the principle that all political opinions relate to
the state in some way. When this principle is de-centered, the troublesome
question of whether a group is exercising state functions can be properly
avoided. At this juncture it is vital to recall that an analysis of whether
state protection is possible occurs in analyzing the persecution aspect of
the definition. It is not useful for understanding whether risk arises for
reason of political opinion.
A large number of protection claims in this criminal group category
have been made in the United States, where the Elias Zacarias decision is
the governing authority and remains the starting point for analysis.174
Looking at the case law that has amassed in the interim sharpens an ap-
preciation of how the Elias Zacarias ruling fails. In many cases, Elias
Zacarias is reduced to a simple statement: “mere refusal to join a gang
does not constitute political opinion.”175 Or alternatively,
The respondents argue on appeal that the MS-13 attempted to for-
cibly recruit the male respondents into their gang, and that the
gang persecuted the respondents on account of their anti-gang po-
litical opinion.  Given the circumstances of this case, we find that
the respondents’ argument is foreclosed by INS v. Elias
Zacarias.176
172. Id.
173. Qualification Directive, supra note 33.
174. See supra note 38 and accompanying discussion.
175. Mejilla-Romero v. Holder, 600 F.3d 63, 72 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that, in the case
of an eleven-year-old Honduran national who fled following threats from a gang that con-
trolled his neighborhood, and whose parents had supported a different political party than
most of their neighbors, “[e]ven if Mejilla-Romero had shown the attacks were motivated by
his resistance to gangs and gang recruitment, which he did not do, that would not help his
case. Mere refusal to join a gang does not constitute political opinion.”).
176. Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 588 (B.I.A. 2008) (involving Salvadoran
teenaged siblings who left because of threats from a Mara that controlled their neighborhood
after they refused to join). In some cases, this position is developed in more detail. See, e.g.,
Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1490 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In Elias Zacarias the Supreme Court
instructed us to change course. It held that an applicant’s refusal to fight in the context of a
forced recruitment is not enough by itself to show that the persecutor acted ‘on account of’
his political views.”).
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Following Elias Zacarias does not always lead to the conclusion that a
person resisting a violent group is not a refugee. In Mayorga Esguerra the
Ninth Circuit distinguished the case where a member of an elite special-
forces team, refused to join a guerilla group on the basis of his “manifest
pro-government allegiance,” which was evidenced by his employment.177
In Martinez Buendia, the Seventh Circuit held that “Elias Zacarias does
not stand for the proposition that attempted recruitment by a guerilla
group will never constitute persecution on account of the asylum seeker’s
political beliefs.”178
There are three important points to take away from the Elias Zacarias
legacy. The first is that the legacy is scarcely settled. In both Mejilla Ro-
mero and Mayorga Esguerra there were strongly worded dissents arguing
for a different reading of the Supreme Court’s ruling, but the dissentients
argued in opposite directions, emphasizing the confusion the case has
fostered.
The second is that the distinctions required are very finely split, in-
deed. The fact of a “pro-government allegiance” was decisive in Mayorga
Esguerra, but a desire to align with the government was irrelevant in Elias
Zacarias itself.179
The third important point builds on the first two: given that Elias
Zacarias is a controlling decision that provides neither a definition nor an
overall framework approach, what it leaves in its wake is a confusing and
cross-cutting engagement with facts from which it is difficult to discern
principles. Indeed, the factual engagement is often in the weeds, so to
speak, as many of the cases pay close attention to the claimant’s narrative,
but make little comment on the background political situation in the coun-
try in question. This raises the matter of how to appropriately assess the
context in political opinion cases. It would be close to impossible to pre-
dict what would happen in a given case on the basis of this jurisprudence,
and, as many of the cases arise in the United States, this serves to empha-
size that a new approach would be valuable, and must be workable in this
setting especially.
The Canadian jurisprudence, following from the lead ruling in Ward,
has encountered a domestically idiosyncratic issue that has sidelined de-
velopments in political opinion analysis involving criminal groups. In 2002,
the domestic legislation was amended to allow protection when a nexus to
one of the grounds of protection in the refugee definition could not be
177. Mayorga-Esguerra v. Holder, 409 F. App’x 81, 83 (9th Cir. 2010).
178. Martinez-Buendia v. Holder, 616 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2010) (granting protection
to a woman who had organized humanitarian health care services in rural Colombia and who
had been threatened because she refused to credit the FARC with the success of her work).
179. The facts could easily have been interpreted differently on the basis that Mayorga-
Esguerra was a government employee and Elias-Zacarias was not, therefore supporting the
government in Elias-Zacarias’ case meant something more than keeping his job.
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established in cases where the risk faced is one of torture or death.180 This
new provision has been used most extensively in cases that fit in this cate-
gory, with the result that analysis of political opinion in the context of
flight from criminality has diminished.181
The comparatively few Canadian cases that do analyze political opin-
ion demonstrate that the Ward approach does not get at the heart of the
issue for many factual situations involving violent groups. In Labsari, the
court held that a young Algerian man who refused to turn over his truck to
an armed terrorist group for use in its activities may have been perceived
as expressing a political opinion and sent the matter back for reconsidera-
tion.182 The court did not give a clear account of why this perception might
exist. In Gomez, the court held that resisting extortion could possibly be
the basis for an imputed political opinion, without further explanation.183
These two pre-2002 cases contrast with Yoli and Suarez from the same
time frame, in which informing against a violent group and resisting in-
volvement with it were considered not to be bases for imputed political
opinion.184 Each case purports to apply the Ward analysis, but it is difficult
to point to how the definition from Ward influences the outcome, as the
court tends to reach its conclusion without spelling out the analytic steps
taken in reaching it.
The more recent Canadian cases that apply political opinion as the
potential ground of protection show some tendency to skirt the substance
of the issue. In Sanchez, a state employee who also ran a business report-
ing lawbreakers to the government ran afoul of the FARC in Colombia
because he was infringing upon their extortion racket. Originally rejected
because there was no political opinion, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled
without providing analysis of political opinion.185 Tobias Gomez and
Navarro were cases where shop owners resisted extortion by gangs, the
180. There are several other limiting criteria, as well as a higher standard of proof than
in the case of refugee determination. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C.
2001, c 27 § 97 (Can.).
181. As in the United States, claims from Central and South America where violent
groups are the source of risk have received considerable attention in Canada. Of the four
decisions ever designated by the Immigration and Refugee Board as “jurisprudential guides”
or “persuasive decisions,” two have involved flight from gang violence in Costa Rica and
Mexico respectively: RPD File No. TA2-14980), [2003] RPDD 6 (Can. Ont.) (revoked as a
jurisprudential guide in October 2011), and RPD File No. TA6-07453, [2007] RPDD 253
(Can.). The Board’s selection of these cases demonstrates the importance of violent group
persecution to its caseload.
182. Labsari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] F.C. 666, ¶ 41
(Can. Ont.).
183. Gomez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2001 F.C.T. 647, [2001]
F.C.J. 965 (Can.).
184. See Yoli v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No. 1823
(Can. Ont.); Suarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [1996] F.C.J. 1036
(Can.).
185. See Sanchez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] FCA 99
(Can.).
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former in El Salvador and the latter in Mexico.186 Each case was argued as
a matter of political opinion, but this analysis was rejected by the courts on
the basis of the judges’ views of what the gangs were likely thinking.187
The political opinion analysis here potentially departs from Ward, where
the INLA was explicitly not analyzed as perceiving Mr. Ward’s action as
political.
Canadian jurisprudence also demonstrates that the dividing line be-
tween whistleblower cases and cases involving violent groups is sometimes
blurred. In Yoli, the agent of persecution is a violent group that the appli-
cant wished to dissociate from after he became aware of the extent of its
criminal activities.188 While the applicant had not reported these activities,
he was at risk because of the possibility that he could do so. The Court
considered the case one of “refusing to participate in criminal activity” or
“witnessing and/or reporting crime,” and held that his actions did not
evince a political opinion.189 Yoli, along with Suarez and Sanchez, are ex-
amples that might be considered “whistleblowing (informing) on violent
groups,” which are then analyzed as “political opinion or not” depending
on how fully the group has become imbricated with the state.190 A similar
blurring of the lines is evident in a New Zealand ruling that an Applicant’s
actions manifest “a genuinely held belief in the essential human dignity of
all and that nobody should be subjected to being trafficked and an opinion
that corruption among public officials and politicians in Pakistan needs to
be tackled.”191 In other words, it is important to bear in mind that these
categories have been created to assist solving the political opinion puzzle
and do not have any intrinsic role independent of that.
186. Gomez v. Canada, [2011] F.C. ¶ 17; Navarro v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship &
Immigration), [2011] F.C. 768, ¶ 4 (Can.).
187. See Gomez, [2011] F.C. ¶ 26:
The applicants point to objective evidence that suggests that those who resist gangs
in El Salvador may be subject to retribution. However, the documentary evidence
does not suggest that this opposition, in the eyes of the Mara-18, is perceived to be
a political stand against them. It appears that the applicants’ refusal to comply with
escalating extortion demands, and Luis’ resistance to recruitment, were acts of eco-
nomic and personal preservation, not a political stance.
See also Refugee Appeal No. 2507/95 Re JEAH [1996] NZRSAA (22 Apr. 1996) (N.Z.)
(reaching a similar conclusion where the claimant resisted extortion by the Shining Path be-
cause he could no longer afford the payments).
188. Yoli, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1823.
189. Id. ¶ 27, ¶ 33; see also Suarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)
[1996] F.C.J. 1036 (Can.).
190. The IRB’s “persuasive decision” on Mexico, supra note 181, is also a good example
of this line blurring.
191. Refugee Appeal Nos. 76478, 76479, 76480 & 76481, [2010] NZRSAA ¶ 42 (11 June
2010) (N.Z.) (considering an applicant whose anti-trafficking activities marked him a target
of a “mafia gang engaged in human trafficking” and whom the police were unable to
protect).
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In France, applicants at risk of being persecuted by the Taliban have
been rejected for lack of political opinion on the basis that simply belong-
ing to the national police force or the army cannot be the basis of a politi-
cal opinion.192 In the Akhondi decision, the court reached this conclusion
despite the evidence that the applicant had strong anti-Taliban political
views. The political opinion analysis failed because Mr. Akhondi had ar-
gued he was at risk because of his employment as a police officer, not
specifically because of his views.193 These decisions are a sharp contrast
with the American ruling in Mayorga Esguerra, and suggest that it may be
useful to clarify whether and when joining a particular institution could be
considered in and of itself to evince a political opinion.
It is difficult to summarize the lessons of this diverse group of cases. It
is apparent in this array that persecution by violent groups is prevalent;
this means that any new approach will be called upon to make sense of
these types of facts more than any other. If a new method is going to be
useful, it must work to make sense of these cases. It is also evident that
many violent groups pose serious threats, even when they do not have
“state-like” capacities as suggested by the UNHCR guidelines. This obser-
vation raises the possible importance of de-centering the state in political
opinion analysis, if opposition to this type of criminality is to be viewed as
political.
These cases also present the question of whether and when occupying
a role or profession might be evidence of opinion. This is an important
addition to the analysis of what constitutes opinion. These cases also con-
tribute a perspective on ways of characterizing opinions that seems useful
in the whistleblowing context because, in matters of opposition to criminal
violence, the question of whether an action is altruistic, personal or group
oriented falls away from the center of the inquiry. What remains in the
criminal violence cases is a strong need to attune to context in some princi-
pled way in order to separate political opinion from a mundane request for
law enforcement. This analysis can be supported by looking at the ques-
tion of how oppositional the opinion is and, once again, by considering
what is being offered up as an opinion. Finally, these cases demonstrate
how the reasoning in both Elias Zacarias and Ward leaves gaps when
faced with risks posed by violent groups.
E.  Gender-related harms
The final case cluster examined here involves cases where the poten-
tial political opinion links to gender. This cluster is important because the
possibility of gender as the basis of political opinion has been the subject
of explicit disagreement in the major cases.
As the New Zealand Refugee Status Authority’s 2008 decision dem-
onstrates, there is a coherent argument to be made that gender-related
192. See CE Akhondi, June 14, 2010, No. 323669 (Fr.); CE Habibi, 14 June 2010, No.
323671 (Fr.).
193. CE Akhondi, No. 323669.
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harm can be conceptualized as occurring for reasons of political opin-
ion.194 The question of whether and how those fleeing gendered harms are
at risk because of their political opinions is a thorny one, and it has several
dimensions. The complexity of the question makes this cluster of cases
more complicated to assess than any of the previous groups. It also means
that the gender cases generate key insights into all three of the central
questions that must be answered in order to generate a new framework.
Among theorists and scholars, it is widely accepted that opposition to
discriminatory gendered practices ought to be viewed as a political opin-
ion.195 This is the core of the analysis in NZRSAA 76044, but is also stated
plainly in guidelines on gender-related persecution in Canada,196 the
United States,197 Australia,198 and by the UNHCR.199 For example, the
most recent guidance of the UK border agency states:
Non-conformist opinions or behaviour may in certain circum-
stances be the expression of a political opinion or may result in a
woman having a political opinion attributed to her whether she
holds one or not. For instance opposition to institutionalised dis-
crimination against women in society or expressing views in oppo-
sition to the predominant social or cultural norms can be seen to
constitute a political opinion. Non-conformist behaviour in certain
cultures such as refusing to wear a veil, pursuing an education or
choosing a partner could also lead to a woman having a political
opinion attributed to her.200
This guidance reflects precisely the position of the New Zealand Author-
ity: a woman who behaves in a non-conforming way may have a political
opinion attributed to her by someone who wishes to harm her or to deny
protection to her.
At one level, this statement of the issue is the most challenging for
political opinion jurisprudence: non-conforming behavior—which might
range from refusal to marry by a certain age to wearing nail polish—that
contradicts tradition or a societal moral code, but which has no connection
194. Refugee Appeal No. 76044 [2008] NZAR 719 (N.Z.).
195. Examples of this consensus are below, at note 201.
196. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., GUIDELINE 4: WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIM-
ANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION, A.II (1996) (Can.).
197. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV.’S, REFUGEE, ASYLUM, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE: OFFICER TRAINING 35-37 (2011) [hereinafter USCIS
TRAINING GUIDELINES].
198. DEPT. OF IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS, REFUGEE AND HUMANITA-
RIAN VISA APPLICANTS: GUIDELINES ON GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION MAKERS (1996)
(Austl.).
199. U.N. High Comm’r H.R., Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related
Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. DOC HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002).
200. U.K. VISAS & IMMIGRATION, GENDER ISSUE IN THE ASYLUM CLAIM: PROCESS
(2010) (U.K.).
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to government or the public sector, and is engaged in by a woman who
does not view herself as having a political opinion. To invert the classic
second-wave feminist maxim: when is a personal choice political and how
is the private realm politicized?
Despite the high level of agreement in official guidelines and scholarly
literature,201 courts around the world have explicitly disagreed about
whether non-conforming behavior by women constitutes political opinion,
or can be the basis of the imputation of political opinion by potential per-
secutors. There is a significant gulf in the case law. The New Zealand Ref-
ugee Status Appeals Authority has issued a number of decisions that
follow its 2008 ruling that an Alevi Kurdish woman from Turkey expressed
a political opinion through declaring she would end her marriage.202 In
Lazo-Majano, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a
woman fleeing sexual abuse was asserting a political opinion by virtue of
her flight.203 The Immigration and Refugee Board in Canada has ruled
that an Iranian student who was threatened because she had spoken out in
class against wearing the chador was manifesting a political opinion.204 On
the other side of the coin, the United Kingdom’s House of Lords stated in
its seminal ruling in Shah and Islam that a political opinion argument
could not be made out on behalf of two women who had each sought
refuge from marriages where they faced domestic abuse and threats of
201. This consensus is also reflected in secondary literature. See, e.g., HEAVEN CRAW-
LEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS (2001); SHAUNA LABMAN & CATHERINE
DAUVERGNE, Evaluating Canada’s Approach to Gender-Related Persecution: Revisiting and
Re-Embracing ‘Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories’, in GENDER IN REFUGEE
LAW: FROM THE MARGINS TO THE CENTRE 264 (2014); Deborah E. Anker, Legal Change
from the Bottom Up: the Development of Gender Asylum Jurisprudence in the United States,
in GENDER IN REFUGEE LAW: FROM THE MARGINS TO THE CENTRE 46 (Efrat Arbel, Cathe-
rine Dauvergne, & Jenni Millbank eds., 2014); Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the
Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213 (1995).
202. Refugee Appeal No. 76044 [2008] NZAR 719 (N.Z.); see also Refugee Appeal Nos.
76250 & 76251, [2008] NZRSAA (1 Dec. 2008) (N.Z.) (considering a Saudi Arabian woman
who has acted against the wishes of her father, brother and husband by working outside the
home); Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] NZRSAA (16 Aug. 2000) (N.Z.) (considering
an Iranian woman who was “punished” by her husband for infringing traditional rules of
behavior for women).
203. Lazo Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Olimpia has suffered
persecution because of one specific political opinion Zuniga attributed to her. She is, she has
been told by Zuniga, a subversive. Her husband left the country, a policeman has been told,
because she is a subversive. If she complained of Zuniga, she was informed, she would be
killed as a subversive. One cannot have a more compelling example of a political opinion
generating political persecution than the opinion that is held by a subversive in opposition to
the government. Zuniga viewed Olimpia as having such an opinion. The opinion, it may be
said, is not Olimpia’s. It is only imputed to her by Zuniga. And it is imputed by Zuniga
cynically. Zuniga knows that Olimpia is only a poor domestic and washerwoman. She does
not participate in politics. Olimpia, however, does have a political opinion, camouflage it
though she does. She believes that the Armed Force is responsible for lawlessness, rape,
torture, and murder. Such views constitute a political opinion. And she has been persecuted
for possessing it.”).
204. Namitabar v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration), [1994] 2 F.C. 42 (Can.).
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being named as adulterers.205 The guidance decision in Gutierrez Gomez
stated that “sexual politics” and “the politics of the family” would rarely
engage political opinion in a Conventional sense.206 The former United
Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal also ruled that a young woman
who did not want to take on the inherited role as a leader in female genital
cutting, including marrying an elderly local chief, did not have any discern-
able political opinion.207
There are three subgroups of cases in this cluster. A first subgroup
involves the important challenge of imputed political opinion on the basis
of women resisting or rejecting traditional norms, but not otherwise en-
gaging in political activity, nor in any activity that is directed towards the
state, and who have not articulated their actions in political terms. In the
view of his paper, this group of cases is where the true challenge for politi-
cal opinion analysis resides. These cases can be contrasted with two other
types: cases where a woman seeks protection on the basis of opinions that
she identifies as feminist, and cases where male claimants seek protection
on the basis that they are at risk because of their opposition to traditional
roles or practices assigned to women. In both of these latter instances,
regarding the actions as evincing political opinion is straightforward.
These cases are useful because they demonstrate political opinion in the
absence of the state.
To illustrate this point, consider the cases about feminism. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated in Fatin that
“there is little doubt that feminism qualifies as a political opinion.”208
Leaving aside the enormous question of whether feminism can be bundled
up in this or any manner, the facts in Fatin called up this analysis, since Ms.
Fatin presented herself to the tribunal as a woman who supported the de-
posed Shah of Iran and embraced feminist views. Examples of cases where
women articulate political views and views that could be labeled feminist
are found in a range of jurisdictions: an Iranian woman who opposed the
government on the basis of how it treated women and reformists;209 a Chi-
nese woman who advocated against the Communist regime after being de-
nied access to her children because of her partner’s political
205. Islam (A.P.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, R v. Immigration Appeal Tribu-
nal & Another ex parte Shah (A.P.) (Conjoined Appeals) [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal
taken from Eng.). The facts in the Islam case indicated that a precipitating factor for the
violence was that Ms. Islam had intervened in a fight between rival political factions that
took place at the school where she worked. Her husband was associated with one of the
factions.
206. Gutierrez Gomez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2000] UKIAT 00007,
[2001] 1 WLR 549.
207. FB v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2008] UKIAT 00090, ¶¶ 72-74.
208. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1993); see also USCIS TRAINING GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 197.
209. See RRT Case No. 0903537, [2009] RRTA 851 (Austl.).
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connections;210 an Iranian woman who had been arrested for dress code
infringements and for meeting a man in public, who expressed strong
views about women’s rights and also participated in demonstrations advo-
cating for the release of election results;211 and an Afghan woman who
opposed the Mujahideens.212
This group of cases is straightforward because the women involved in
them have deliberately identified themselves as political actors through
some engagement with state. A potential confusion does arise, however,
when decision-makers do not distinguish this state-directed political action
from opposing traditional mores or seeking personal autonomy. This con-
fusion, first introduced in Fatin, is written into the United States Training
Guidelines on Gender:
[O]pposition to institutionalized discrimination of women, expres-
sions of independence from male social and cultural dominance in
society, and refusal to comply with traditional expectations of be-
havior associated with gender (such as dress codes and the role of
women in the family and society) may all be expressions of politi-
cal opinion. Feminism is a political opinion and may be expressed
by refusing to comply with societal norms that subject women to
severely restrictive conditions.213
Teasing out the differences between feminist cases and the non-con-
forming behavior cases may be useful for a broader analysis of political
opinion, and is essential to ensuring that redefining political opinion does
not serve to make women’s state-directed political activities invisible. It is
important to open a space where women can be seen to assert autonomy
and reject traditional roles without being feminists, even just for the sake
of analysis, and where feminists can assert feminism as a political opinion
without rejecting traditional roles or asserting individual autonomy in a
Western stereotypical sense—for example, by doing so while wearing the
burka or performing all of the domestic unpaid labor in their households.
Overtly-articulated feminist politics ought always to be understood as a
matter of political opinion.
The final subset of gender-related cases is a small number of cases
coming from France and Belgium, where men have been recognized as
refugees on the basis of their political opinions about gender; in particular,
their opposition to FGM.214 These cases demonstrate how gender politics
210. See RRT Case No. 0805612, [2008] RRTA 407 (Austl.) (observing that the custody
dispute was “purely domestic” but that the individual’s political activities demonstrated a
political opinion).
211. Refugee Appeal No. 76511 [2010] NZRSAA 118.
212. CRR SR 26 octobre 1994 Mme K. n° 93012524/253902 R.
213. USCIS TRAINING GUIDELINES, supra note 197, at 36.
214. CNDA MD, Mar. 10, 2010, No. 06007197, C+, excerpted in ANNE´E 2010 CONTEN-
TIEUX DES RE´FUGIE´S: JURISPRUDENCE DU CONSEIL D’E´TAT ET DE LA COUR NATIONALE DE
DROIT D’ASILE [2010 REFUGEE LITIGATION: JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE
AND THE NATIONAL COURT OF THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM] 49 (2010) (Fr.):
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can be separated from one’s person. When the applicant for status is not a
woman, it is easier to see the political positioning of gendered questions,
even those that would not likely add up a broadly understood commitment
to feminism per se.215 That a man who opposes the required genital cutting
of women in his society is saying something political seems evident be-
cause of the oppositional content of the view and the power structure it
relates to, even in the absence of the state, or, in some case, even with the
support of the state.
The lesson to be taken from these two subsets is that much political
action bypasses the state and relates instead to other loci of societal
power, such as the family or the clan, which may or may not be ultimately
backed by the state. These cases are less complicated because they do not
raise a question about the nature of opinion, the opinion in question is
overtly stated.
In the most complex subset of these cases, an individual does not state
an opinion at all; she simply, at the very least, lets her hair down or puts on
mascara. Indeed, she may not even perceive this action as remotely politi-
cal or feminist. Can she be at risk because of an imputed political opinion?
This is one of the most challenging hypotheticals for political opinion anal-
ysis, and it engages questions of definition, of context, of opposition and,
most pressingly, of what counts as an opinion.
The gender cases are important not only because of how the variations
within them sharpen questions of complexity, but also because of the ques-
tions presented by the decline of political opinion claims brought by
women.216 The possibility that the political opinion analysis may be failing
“qu’en cas de retour dans son pays, il craint donc avec raison, au sens des stipula-
tions pre´cite´es de la convention de Gene`ve, d’eˆtre perse´cute´ par des groupes tradi-
tionalistes sans pouvoir se pre´valoir utilement de la protection des autorite´s
locales, lesquels perc¸oivent son engagement contre la pratique des mutilations
ge´nitales fe´minines comme une opinion politique transgressive des normes sociales
et religieuses toujours pre´gnantes au Mali.”
“If returned to his country, he has a reasonable fear, in the sense of the above-
mentioned provisions of the Geneva Convention, of being persecuted by tradition-
alist groups without the power to avail himself of the protection of the local au-
thorities, who perceive his engagement against FGM as a political opinion
transgressing social and religious norms always prevalent in Mali.”
See also Conseil du Contentiuex des E´trangers [The Counsel for Alien Disputes] June 30,
2010, BELGIUM: CONSEIL DU CONTENTIEUX DES ETRANGERS, No. 45.823, http://
www.refworld.org/docid/4dad99b32.html (Belg.) (holding that, where a Guinean man had
been active in an organization opposing FGM for a number of years and fled with his daugh-
ter so that she would not be subject such practices, “the petitioner manifests a form of trea-
son in regard to customary practices largely widespread. Therefore, the alleged persecution is
connected to one of the reasons of the Geneva Convention.”).
215. These cases contrast sharply with the Supreme Court of Canada’s Chan ruling in
which a man fleeing compulsory sterilization was treated skeptically. See supra note 126 and
accompanying text.
216. Most recently, cases involving gender-related persecution are most often consid-
ered on the basis of membership in a particular social group, the group being defined as
“women” or some subset thereof. This was an important feature of the Fatin case, which
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women at risk of persecution looms large behind this decline. In sum,
these cases squarely raise the issues of how and whether to position gov-
ernment or even the state in defining the political. They also bring a focus
on whether resistance or oppositional posture ought to be required for an
opinion to be political. Thinking through gender-related political opinion
compels the decision-maker to consider how, why, and when opinions
about private concerns, micro-level concerns, or matters of self-interest
link up with larger social themes and thereby take on characteristics that
are, to recall the words of the Second Circuit, “typical of political pro-
test.”217 Thus, feminist analysis brings to the question a well-developed
framework for illuminating the political in the personal.
This cluster also presents important questions about the parameters
for imputing political opinion: in circumstances where an individual does
not perceive her own opinions or actions as political, how should a deci-
sion-maker proceed? These cases raise this question, but provide little by
way of an answer. Finally, and indirectly, some of the cases that reject
gendered opinions as a basis for protection suggest that these opinions
should not warrant protection under the Refugee Convention. The ques-
tion presented here is whether some political opinions are so personal that
they ought to be defined out of political opinion analysis for refugee law
purposes. This view is important for several decision-makers, but is
strongly rejected by scholars, and thus it requires comment in developing a
new analysis.218
IV. MAPPING A WAY FORWARD
This detailed examination of the case law highlights the contours of
the areas of debate surrounding political opinion. Having evaluated these
cases, this paper returns to its three central questions: what is opinion,
which opinions are political, and should any political opinions be
excluded.
The case law squarely, but implicitly, raises the question of what ought
to be considered an opinion. Interestingly, the parameters of opinion are
not something that decision-makers have grappled with overtly. To this
extent, refugee law mirrors the scant guidance from international human
despite leading to a strong statement about feminism, was not argued as a political opinion
case. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“The petitioner also argues that she
is entitled to withholding of deportation or asylum based on her ‘political opinion,’ but her
brief treats this argument as essentially the same as her argument regarding membership in a
particular social group. Indeed, her brief relegates discussion of this entire subject to a single
short footnote that simply states that her “political claim is intertwined with her social group
claim.”). The 2012 GENSEN Report on women’s asylum claims in nine EU member states
concluded that recognition of political opinion claims by women was declining. See Study on
Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Law, Policies and
Practice Focusing on Women in Nine EU Member States 71-73, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 462.481
(2012). This conclusion accords with trends that I have identified in recent collaborative
work. See ARBEL, DAUVERGNE & MILLBANK, supra note 201, at 2-4.
217. Yu v. Holder, 693 F.3d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 2012).
218. See supra note 201 and accompanying discussion.
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rights law suggesting that opinion is almost unlimited. This open-ended
notion is underlined by linking opinion to thought or conscience. But in
order for an opinion to be protected, it must be discernable in some way,
even if the decision-maker can stop short of saying that it must be “ex-
pressed.” In the Refugee Convention, “opinion” is modified by “political,”
and most of the disagreement in the jurisprudence goes to the question of
what counts as “political.” But the question of what counts as “opinion”
runs subtly alongside this; it is just rarely identified.
There are two ways that the definition of opinion becomes visible in
the case law. The first is in consideration of whether taking on a particular
role can evince a political opinion. In the cases discussed here, contested
roles include law student, police officer, and soldier. It is easy to envision
others such as party member, lawyer, and humanitarian volunteer. In all
cases, what makes the example work as a thought experiment is how the
contextual factors are imagined. For example, some people joined the Nazi
party in order to keep their jobs. Would their role as members evince a
political opinion? And if so, what would the content of that opinion be?
“This party is so dangerous I had better join?” “I am not willing to oppose
this?” “I am Jewish and this will help hide me?”
Whether taking on a role constitutes opinion points directly to the sec-
ond way in which the cases present the question of opinion, and that is in
analyzing ‘imputation’. It is settled law that an opinion need not be stated
in order to be a successful basis for a refugee claim.219 And furthermore, it
need not be true; but it does have to be something. Analytically, the ques-
tion is whether the agent of persecution views the claimant as having a
political opinion.220 In practical terms, that question is for the court. How
far can or should the court go in imputing an opinion? The answer to this
question depends on what an opinion is. Especially in the case clusters
regarding flight from violent groups and regarding gender, decision-mak-
ers varied enormously in their methodologies for imputation and, seem-
ingly, in their willingness to “impute” at all. For example, weakness of
conviction was a central issue in Gutierrez Gomez,221 whereas, in RT
(Zimbabwe), doing nothing at all was the essence of an expression of neu-
trality, and the court explicitly stated that it would not draw a distinction
between strongly articulated neutrality and indifferent neutrality.222
If an opinion need not be overtly expressed, it is intuitively correct to
say that it equally need not require a specific act. But, unlike the ICCPR’s
analysis,223 for an opinion to be the object of a risk in the refugee law
setting, it must have some discernable trace in the world. Specifying such
219. See, e.g., HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 5, at 407-23; GOODWIN-GILL & MC-
ADAM, supra note 5, at 87, 89, 104.
220. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 5, at 409-11.
221. See Gutierrez Gomez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2000] UKIAT 00007 ¶
68-70, [2001] 1 WLR 549.
222. See RT (Zim.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2012] UKSC 38, ¶  46,
[2013] 1 AC 152.
223. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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traces must therefore be accounted for in a new approach. Here, this pa-
per’s tentative conclusion is that “opinion” need not trouble the analysis
when there is some overt statement of it; the problems arise instead in the
doubly constructed realm of imputation, which is doubly constructed be-
cause the decision-maker must speculate about the speculation of the per-
secutor. While international human rights law conceives of opinion as
including any thought or idea, no matter how private, personal or guarded,
refugee law, by its operating logic, requires that an opinion have some
observable trace in the world There must be something that a decision-
maker can point to as evincing an opinion; otherwise, there is no basis on
which a potential persecutor could possibly form a view.
In regard to the second question, whether a given opinion is political,
decision-makers have provided a great deal of fodder for analysis. The
most important analytic aspect to emerge is accounting for context. This is
central because it almost overshadows the question of the political en-
tirely: what counts as political is always contextual. The conclusion lies
behind the New Zealand Authority’s view that a textural analysis of con-
text should replace any definition of political opinion. Having rejected this
view, the remaining task is then to provide markers about how decisions
should move forward; in other words, to give guidance about what aspects
of context matter and what a decision-maker should take into account in
defining government, state, or opposition.
The United States cases, for example, have generally looked less
broadly than others at what might be called background factors. How far
should one look? In a functioning democracy with robust rule of law insti-
tutions, it may be the case that whistleblowing against government actors
would not be considered a political opinion. In all of the cases, the social
and large-scale political background provides the setting in which the
question is asked and answered. In the contestation between Klinko and
Storozhenko, a key factor was how to evaluate the Ukrainian govern-
ment’s efforts against corruption.224 Context matters because it helps de-
termine where power lies and thus what is properly counted as political.
This will be true regardless of where one draws the line on the centrality of
government and the state. This paper would not go so far as to agree with
the Gutierrez Gomez tribunal that the political is so infinitely malleable
that no political actors can be specified out of context.225 For example,
members of political parties and elected officials will be political actors in
every instance. But the point about malleability is well-taken, even short
of this limit. Context also is a vital guard against the type of unrestrained
abstraction that makes definitions of political opinion look absurd. For ex-
ample, abstracting the question of whether to have a child from the con-
text of coercive population control makes it hard to discern its character.
224. See discussion supra Section III.C.
225. See Gutierrez Gomez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2000] UKIAT 00007 ¶
40, [2001] 1 WLR 549.
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A second potential limit to the political, which is well canvassed in the
case law, is how important government or even possibly “the state” is to
assessing what counts as political. The definitions set out in both Ward and
Gutierrez Gomez use the state as a touchstone.226 The whistleblower cases
are united by their focus on whistleblowing about or against the state.227
In analysis of the criminal group cases, the extent to which the group and
the state are intertwined features prominently in the typical analysis. Re-
quiring that a political opinion must in some way bear on government,
governance, or the state—or, in the Gutierrez Gomez formulation, on
power transactions or major actors that are themselves related to govern-
ment—would be a clear line, but it would oftentimes limit the reach of
political-opinion-based protection in matters of criminal groups and gen-
der-related persecution. Drawing the line in this way would have the ad-
vantage of clarity, but it would certainly result in a smaller group of
individuals acquiring protection on this basis than is presently the case. It
would exclude a significant number of gender-related claims where agree-
ment about the political nature of the opinions involved is already wide-
spread, such as the cases of overt feminist argument. It would also run
counter to current UNHCR and national government guidelines on
gender.228
A third potential indicator of political that emerges from the case
methodology concerns the role of an oppositional posture in making an
opinion political. While it appears settled that an opinion need not be de-
veloped in opposition to the government in order to qualify as political, it
is generally the case that opinions that have been recognized as a worthy
basis for refugee protection are in some way oppositional. This is one of
the things that the Second Circuit may have been intimating when it wrote
of actions that are “typical of political protest.”229 The notion of opposi-
tion is something that could usefully be developed further. Claimants who
benefit from protection on the basis of an imputed political opinion, or
indeed any political opinion, are all individuals who could have kept quiet
and done nothing, but who instead chose to do something, and that action
was against some actor or force in their society that was able to exercise
power, legitimate or otherwise, against them. Despite this, they acted, and
one way to account for that action is their view about something. This is
even true in the gender cases regarding failure to conform to societal
norms: the case law has never presented the argument that the woman in
question did not know of the existence of the norm, only that her opposi-
tion to it was personal or non-political.
Opposition brings the idea of power into focus. This was the common-
ality between Gutierrez Gomez and the New Zealand approach, and was
also an idea that figures in locating politics in the gender cases. The notion
226. See discussion supra Section II.
227. See discussion supra Section III.C.
228. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
229. Yu v. Holder, 693 F.3d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 2012).
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of opposition also provides some clues to key features of context. For ex-
ample, situating power within Elias Zacarias would foster a richer analysis.
Beyond the factors of context, government or state, and opposition,
decision-makers employed a number of potential indicators of the bound-
aries of political. These characteristics are often paired in the analysis, and
the pairings have some conceptual overlap. Accordingly, decision-makers
have sometimes paid attention to whether an opinion is self-interested
(NZ 2010) or altruistic (Storozhenko), sometimes to whether an opinion
matters to just one individual or whether it motivates a group (Yu) some-
times to whether it has a public aspect or whether it is private or personal.
This was the line of reasoning behind rejecting a number of claims on the
basis that the actions in question were not political, but instead simply
reflected that the claimant did not want to go to jail, to be put out of work,
to continue to pay extortion money or to conform to traditional practice.
The notion of self-interest is potentially fruitful because it introduces a
number of associated ideas. For example, a ‘self-interested’ view that a
woman will leave an abusive marriage could be analyzed as linking to a
broader macro-politics in a society where such an action is not permitted.
The group versus individual theme can also be expressed by saying that
some opinions are particularistic rather than generalized. For example, a
whistleblowing action was evaluated by a number of decision-makers
through consideration of whether it served, or even developed, group in-
terests, rather than solely develop the interests of the claimant. An alter-
native way to interrogate the public-private tension might be to assess
whether an action that reflects or connects to powerful societal trends or
actors can ever be fully considered to be private.
Overall, these questions show decision-makers grappling with a desire
to articulate some way to analyze the substantive content of an opinion,
and thus to find some proxy value to equate with “political.” It may well
be, however, that these proxies simply reveal that some claimants are
more appealing than others. Altruistic team players who risk public action
may well be more sympathetic, and this line of analysis fits particularly
well with human-rights approaches to whistleblowing as expression. But
few would dispute that politics in the ordinary sense of the word can be
self-interested and individualistic, and feminist analysts have done forty
years of work on jettisoning the idea that the personal would not be con-
sidered political.230 Similarly, it is well-established that heroism is not re-
quired for refugee protection.231
Answering the question of what constitutes the political in a way that
attunes to the needs of refugee decision-makers requires a number of
steps. Political opinion should not be defined by reference to government
or the state. While opinions regarding government or the state will be in-
volved in many, or maybe even most, cases, the case law demonstrates a
230. See discussion infra Section II.E.
231. See, e.g., HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 5, at 407-09; GOODWIN-GILL & MC-
ADAM, supra note 5, at 86-90.
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number of compelling situations where political opinions have been found,
sensibly, to exist without a link to formal political structures. This paper is
of two minds about the requirement for opposition because it could oper-
ate in two ways. In the traditional political sphere, opposition does not
seem to be a helpful criterion. A view such as “I support the government”
or “I vote Republican” is evidently political even though it is not tinged
with an oppositional note or a tone of protest. Beyond the traditional po-
litical sphere, however, opposition does seem helpful in identifying views
to which an individual is strongly committed and for which she is willing to
take risks, views that one could hide or disavow, but for a strong personal
commitment. In questions of context, a danger arises where a decision-
maker attempts to isolate the essence of an imputed opinion; it is easy for
this process to render the opinion an isolated abstraction. Turning to con-
text ought to involve considering the power dynamics that surround any
expressed or imputed view, and considering how those dynamics link, or
fail to link, to formal authority within the relevant state. Such an approach
to context would allow for opinions to be political without touching upon
state or government, but would still leave a space for considering how the
formal political sector is constructed in a given society.
The final question to address is whether some clearly political opin-
ions ought to be excluded from the ambit of refugee protection. The easi-
est hypotheticals to conjure here are examples like “The president ought
to be assassinated” or “The holocaust did not occur.” Such examples are
repugnant and, in many domestic legal systems, would be excluded from
freedom of expression protections. The examples that arose in the political
opinion cases came from the conscientious objectors cases, whistleblower
cases and gender cases. In analyzing military objectors, some objections
were excluded not on the basis that they were not political opinions, but
on the basis that human rights law did not extend parallel protection to
military objectors. In the whistleblower cases, the potential limit would
similarly come from drawing on adjacent analysis of freedom of expres-
sion, rather than opinion, in the European Court of Human Rights. In the
gender cases, the exclusion arises somewhat differently, on the basis that
some political opinions should not be protected because they are too
personal.
What this final question brings to the fore is how political opinion fits
into the refugee definition as a whole. If one takes the view that some
political opinions are not to be protected, s/he must be vigilant to ensure
that s/he is not encroaching on a question of nexus or persecution, includ-
ing state protection. This caution, in this paper’s view, leans toward not
constraining, or even subtracting from, the definition of political. It is ana-
lytically clearer to locate, for example, the risk one may face because of
uttering hate speech within the analysis of whether a sanction is persecu-
tory or whether the state will protect one from an angry mob.
These questions, and tentative answers, direct a decision-maker to-
wards a new framework for defining political opinion. To move forward, it
is vital to remember the starting points. There are two: 1) existing defini-
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tions have not provided sufficient guidance for decision-makers, and 2)
political opinion is not defined in an adjacent area of law in a way that can
be easily borrowed for Refugee Convention purposes. This means that the
best guidance for developing a new definition comes from the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties: political opinion must be interpreted
in its context, in light of its object and purpose.232 Courts around the
world have agreed that the purpose of the Refugee Convention is to pro-
vide surrogate human rights protection to individuals at risk of being
persecuted.233
Considering the parameters of political opinion is straightforward
when both “political” and “opinion” are identifiable in an uncontested
way. In the case of ‘political’ this happens when the opinion is about the
government of the day or about core elements of the state.234 In the case
of “opinion,” it happens when the view in question has been overtly ex-
pressed in words or in some gesture that could not conceivably have an-
other purpose. Many political opinion claims do fit within these
parameters, but even the settled core of political opinion jurisprudence
reaches beyond this understanding on both vectors.
In the case of “opinion,” it is vital that imputed opinions be a basis for
refugee protection, because otherwise those who are falsely accused or
tainted by association would be excluded from protection. Understanding
the limits of imputed political opinion requires one to be deliberate about
what constitutes an opinion. In the refugee context, while there is no re-
quirement that an individual have expressed the view in question, there
must be something that a decision-maker can point to that evinces the
opinion. In other words, the decision-maker must be able to give an ac-
count of the imputation process. As an example, consider again the Ward
ruling. The court held that Ward was at risk because of his view that inno-
cent people should not be killed in political struggle; it did not consider
that the risk may have accrued because Ward was viewed as a coward or a
snitch.235 The analysis will always be difficult because there will rarely be
direct evidence of the imputed opinion. In Ward, the imputation is made
possible by the evidence of the truth of this opinion, and the way that the
opinion plausibly accounts for the persecutor’s actions. It makes sense to
have a plausibility threshold for imputing an opinion.
In other cases, however, an inverse reasoning process will apply. This
will be the case, for example, when no opinion is expressed either at the
time when the risk arises or before the decision-maker. The gender cases
involving non-conforming behavior provide an example here. To take de-
liberately trivial examples to press the analysis to its extremes, consider
the case of a woman who is at risk because she wears short skirts and
232. See VCLT, supra note 13, at 340.
233. See, e.g., HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 5, at 51; GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM,
supra note 5, at 9-12.
234. Accepting here that the boundary of ‘the state’ is sometimes difficult to discern at
its edges.
235. See Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 750 (Can.).
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make-up. She may do this solely because she follows fashion trends; she
may have no political motivation whatsoever, and she may not consider
herself a feminist, nor embrace any aspect of feminism. Indeed, she could
even oppose feminism. All she wants to do is choose her clothing and per-
sonal presentation, even though her society frowns upon this. Whether this
action can be the basis for an imputed opinion will depend fully on the
context in which a potential persecutor acts. If someone seeks to harm her
on the basis that he is violently opposed to short skirts, this is not the
imputation of an opinion to her. If someone seeks to harm her because of
his view that women ought to dress in a particular way, then the persecu-
tor is imputing an opinion.
How can the context, object and purpose of the Convention assist this
analysis? The objective of providing surrogate human rights protection
helps us attune to what is relevant about context in this question. A person
clearly has a human right to dress however he or she chooses.236 Whether
dress can be the subject of imputed political opinion will depend on the
extent to which dress norms are controlled by powerful forces in a society
(this idea elides to defining the political, as will become clear below). That
is, if this human right is not protected in a given society, this indicates that
a potential persecutor may indeed be imputing a political opinion in re-
gard to it. It does not determine the issue, but it is a useful signal.
Both the Ward case and the non-conforming behavior example
demonstrate how individual choice is linked to our understanding of opin-
ion. This fits with the notion that at international human rights law, free-
dom of opinion protects matters of conscience. This in turn can lead to
some purchase on the question of when occupying a role can be the basis
for imputing a political opinion. When role-based political opinion is at
issue, it is useful to consider whether the individual had a choice in assum-
ing the role in question; the degree of choice cannot answer the question
fully, but it may provide an indicator. Considering choice, for example,
provides an explanation of the outcome in Gutierrez Gomez: the tribunal
did not consider the claimant to be a human rights activist, but rather
someone required by her role as law student to do human rights work.237
The decision-maker found that the putative persecutor did not impute an
opinion to the claimant because it knew she was not exercising a choice.
This assessment may not seem plausible, but that is a second question.
A focus on surrogate human rights protection can bolster the role-
opinion analysis as well: more anxious scrutiny should be given to roles
that are by their nature manifestations of an individual’s human rights.
Not surprisingly, many of these points about how to understand “opin-
ion” bump up against questions of how to understand “political.” Specifi-
cally, in the non-conforming behavior cases, the human rights backdrop
provides clues to whether dress is politicized, and, in analyzing the dy-
236. This is subject to some limits such as the human rights of others and specific rules
of dress in the workplace or other settings.
237. Gutierrez Gomez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2000] UKIAT 00007 ¶¶
69-70, [2001] 1 WLR 549.
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namic of choice, the range of possible choices will often be defined in po-
litical terms. Before getting to these specifics, it is useful to set out the
broad contours of the political realm.
While opinion has been almost un-interrogated in both refugee and
human rights case law, contestation about political opinion protection in
refugee law has almost always been contestation about what counts as
“political.” This paper concludes that the political ought to extend beyond
government; the state is a useful starting point, but it does make the ques-
tion of where the limit is thornier. If politics is not limited by these formal
parameters, but is also not everything, what are the parameters? Here,
apposite guidance is provided by the New Zealand decisions and, indi-
rectly, by Gutierrez Gomez. In both instances, the discussion was about
power dynamics in a given society. The New Zealand approach was partly
objectionable because it rejected any definition, but in other aspects much
of the finely crafted analysis was very apt. The Gutierrez Gomez ruling
required a linkage back to government, but this final linkage could be
omitted. In sum, it would be workable to define “political” as relating to
the power structures of a given society that ultimately have the capacity,
legitimately or otherwise, to compel an individual or group to behave in a
certain way through coercive means.
Defining political in this way explains why ‘oppositional’ opinions
often look more like political opinions than do ‘agreeable opinions. The
human right to freedom of opinion exists to protect unpopular, disagreea-
ble minority opinions; opinions that are majoritarian rarely need protec-
tion. For this reason, the oppositional quality of an opinion provides a
signal that it may well be political: it is engaged with, or more specifically
against, power that ultimately has the capacity to be coercive. This signal is
more important in cases beyond the limits of the state because there are
few other signposts in these circumstances. Majoritarian and supportive
opinions will rarely arise in refugee determinations: it is dissenters who are
at risk. Thus opposition is not a prerequisite for something to be political;
but, in the refugee context, it is an acute indicator.
Thinking about how societal power limits choice, or whether norms
about dress are coercively enforced assists in understanding when an opin-
ion might be plausibly imputed and when such an opinion is political.
CONCLUSION
In the end, this suggestion of a new approach offers only a beginning.
This paper has asserted that the greatest challenges arise when opinion is
imputed and the political is beyond the state. Regarding imputed opinions,
it has suggested that imputation must attach to some act, or some specifia-
ble absence of an action; that it must be plausible; and that human rights
analysis can help ascertain plausibility. In regard to political, this paper has
asserted that opinions will concern politics when they are informed by
power dynamics, which, (in a given society) are, or have the capacity to be,
coercive.
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Context is vital to understanding both what might fairly be considered
to an imputed opinion and where the political ends. It might fairly be said
that this paper’s approach amounts to injecting a definitional structure
into the New Zealand jurisprudence. In looking to context, decision-mak-
ers must look beyond the specific events recounted by any claimant to
consider both the underlying human rights at stake in a given setting and
the power structures embedded deeply within a given society. By doing
this, refugee protection can attune to those in need of surrogate human
rights protections because they lack power and hold unpopular views, peo-
ple who could choose to simply ‘knuckle under’ but resist the imposition
of power by an actor or institution that has more societal legitimacy or that
possesses some means of coercion. These two markers—human rights and
power structures—are the contextual markers that should guide analysis,
ensuring that decision-makers look far enough beyond the immediate facts
of a case to avoid unanchored abstractions.
